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Supreme Court of India

LUDHICHEM AGENCIES ETC. versus AHMED R.V. PEER MOHAMED AND ANR.

Decided
15 September 1981
Judges listed
R.S. PATHAK (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1982] 1 S.C.R. 712 · 1981 INSC 165
Not shown
1 other citation string that other judgments attach to this one, on evidence too thin or too divided to publish.

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The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

PATHAK, J. This and the connected petitions pray for special leave to appeal to this Court against the refusal of the Bombay High Court to grant relief under Article 227 of the Constitution in the matter of the dismissal of six declaratory suits filed by the petitioners.

pp. 713–714, margin H

Unnumbered paragraph

The first respondent, Ahmed R.V. Peer Mohamed, is the owner of a property, "Peerbhai Mansion". situate on Vithalbhai Patel Road, Bombay. He let out the entire first floor to the second respondent, Smt. Saraswatibai Dahyabhai Bhatt. The first floor consisted of a hall and three rooms and an adjoining terrace. It seems that Saraswatibai sub-divided the hall into a number of cabins, and transferred them to the occupation of the petitioners in this and the connected special leave petitions. The landlord served a notice dated July 28, 1962 on her terminating her tenancy and thereafter filed an ejectment suit No. 576/5157 of 1962. A decree for ejectment was passed in 1966. An appeal by Saraswatibai was dismissed in 1972. ·;The landlord took out execution of the decree. Obstructionist notice was served on all the petitioners and was made absolute ~in favour of the landlord on February 27, 1974. The petitioners appealed, and on November 30, 1976 these appeals were dismissed.

p. 714, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

The six petitioners then filed separate suits Nos. 5734 to 5739 of 1976 against the landlord for a declaration that they were lawful sub-tenants or licensees entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and for a permanent injunction restraining the landlord from executing the decree for ejectment obtained against Saraswatibai. During the trial of the suits the sole issue pressed before the trial Judge was whtther the petitioners were entitled ~to the benefit of the Act as lawful sub-tenants or as deemed tenants or as protected licensees. The Trial Judge ruled that they were not so protected and he dismissed the suits on March 29, 1978. The petitioners appealed. The only point raised in appeal was whether the petitioners could be described as lawful sub-tenants or protected licensees. Affirming the findings of the trial Judge the appellate Court held that the petitioners were inducted into the premises after 1960 and, therefore, were not entitled to be regarded as lawful sub-tenants. It found that Saraswatibai had become a statutory tenant on the termination of her tenancy by the notice dated July 28, 1962, and the petitioners were her licensees and after the decree for ejectment against Saraswatibai on September 30, 1966 her rights and interest in the premises came to an end and from that date the licensees were not entitled to any statutory protection. Aceordingly, the appellate Court maintained the dismissal of the suits filed by the petitioners.

p. 714, margin D

Unnumbered paragraph

The petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court, and the High Court after hearing the parties rejected the petitions by its order dated July 15, 1981. These petitions for special leave to appeal are directed against that order.

p. 715, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

Mr. Soli Sorabjee, appearing for the petitioner in S.L.P. No. 5631 of 1981, contends that the petitioner must be regarded as a licensee entitled to the benefit of sub-s. (2) of s. 14 read with sub-s. (l) of s. 15-A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. He urges that in virt11e of the definition of "licensee" set forth in sub-s. (4A) of s. 5 of the Act, that is to say, a person who is in occupation of the premises under a subsisting agreement for licence, the petitioner,imust be regarded as a licensee in occupation on February I, 1973, and therefore a tenant falling within the terms of sub-s. (I) of s. 15-A. On that, learned counsel says, the petitioner must he deemed, pursuant to sub-s. (2) of s. 14, to be a tenant of the landlord, the first respondent, on the terms and conditions of the agreement. Now, there can he no doubt that if the petitioner can be said to be a licensee in occupation on February I, 1973 he is entitled to assert that he has become a tenant of the landlord. But a licensee is one who is in occupation under a subsisting agreement for licence. The agreement for licence must be subsisting on the date on which he claims to be a licensee. In the instant case, in order to establish his claim the petitioner must be in occupation on February I, 1973 under an agreement for licence subsisting on that date.

p. 715, margin A

Unnumbered paragraph

In our opinion, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit claimed by him. An agreement for licence can subsist and continue to take effect only so long as the licensor continues to enjoy a right, title or interest in the premises. On the termination of his right, title or interest in the premises, the agreement for licence comes to an end. If the licensor is a tenant, the agreement for licence terminates wit)! the tenancy. No tenant is ordinarily competent to grant a licence enduring beyond his tenancy. On the termination of the licensor's tenancy the licensee ceases to be a licensee. This loss of status is the point from which sub·s. (2) of s. 14 begins to operate and in consequence of its operation, the erstwhile licensee becomes a tenant of the landlord on the terms and conditions of the agreement.

p. 715, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

What have we here " Saraswatibai ceased to be tenant of any description long before February I, 1973. The contractual tenancy came to an end when the notice to quit dated July 28, 1962 took effect and the statutory tenancy terminated when ihe decree for ejectment was pf.ssed thereafter. Before February I, 1973 she had ceased to be a tenant. With that, the agreement for licence stood automatically terminated. In consequence, the petitioner cannot legitimately claim to be a licensee on February I, 1973.

pp. 715–716, margin H

Unnumbered paragraph

Mr. Sorabjee relies on Madhusudan A. Mahale v. P.M. Gidh and others, 1 but we are unable to see any support for the petitioner in the judgment in that case .

p. 716, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

In our jndgment, Special Leave Petition No. 5631 of 1981 must fail.

p. 716, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

Mr. D.V. Patel, a, pearing for the petitioner in Special Leave Petition No. 5632 of 1981, points out that the petitioner had been in occupation of the entire fiat as a sub-tenant since 1943 and that in 1960 he had merely restricted his occupation to the portion presently occupied by him. It must be taken, he contends, that he was a lawful sub-tenant since 1943, and therefore, by virtue of sub-s. (!) of s. 14 of the Act he must be regarded as a tenant of the landlord on the determination of Saraswatibai's tenancy. The contention has no force. The courts below have found that the occupation of the petitioner in the premises presently in his possession must be treated as dating back to 1962 and not earlier. That being so, the benefit of sub-s. (I) of s. 14 cannot be available to the petitioner. The benefit can be claimed by a sub-tenant to whom the premises have been lawfully sub-let before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959. Inasmt ch as the sub-tenancy of the petitioner in the premises has been f< und to commence from 1962, we must hold that this petitioner also has no right to continue in possession. This Special Leave Petition must also be rejected.

p. 716, margin C

Unnumbered paragraph

As regards the remaining special leave petitions, it is admitted that they must be disposed of on the same footing as Spec'ial Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5631 of 1981.

p. 716, margin F

Unnumbered paragraph

In the result these special leave petitions are dismissed.

p. 716, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

Learned counsel for the petitioners pray that the petitioners may be allowed to continue in possession for a period of eighteen 16 Maharashtra Journal 436, months in view of the great difficulty in securing alternativo acc·Jm· modation in Bombay. They point out that the landlord, the first respondent, had agreed in the High Court to grant that period to the petitioners but subject to the condition that the petithJOm did not move this Court in appeal. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it appears to us appropriate to direct that the petitioners shall not be dispossessed from the accommodation in their posses· sion upto Sepetember 30, 1982, provided they furnish an undertaking with the Registrar of this Court within one month from today :

pp. 716–717, margin G

Unnumbered paragraph

(a) that they will hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the said premises to the landlord, the first respon-

p. 717, margin C

Unnumbered paragraph

dent, on or before September 30, 1982. (b) that they shall continue to pay to the first respondent by the 7th day of each month an amount on account of the use and occupation of the premises equal to the monthly amount paid by them to the licensor Saras-

p. 717, margin C

Unnumbered paragraph

watibai under the agreement for licence, (c) that they will deposit within three months from today in the court executing the decree in Ejectment Suit No. 576/5157 of 1962 all arrears calculated in accordance with the condition (b) mentioned above for the period commencing with the date of the decree in that

p. 717, margin D

Unnumbered paragraph

suit, and (d) that they shall not induct in the said premises any

p. 717, margin E

Unnumbered paragraph

other person as sub-lessee, licensee or otherwise. N. V.K. Petitions dismissed,

p. 717, margin E