DR. RAM KRISHAN BHARDWAJ versus THE STATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS

PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution tor th~ issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus directing the release of the petitioner Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a medical practitioner iu Delhi and is now said to ·be under unlawful detention.

p. 709

The petitioner was arrested on the 10th March, 1953, under an order of the District :Y1agistrate of Delhi made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act as amended. The grounds of detention were communicated to the petitioner on the 15th March, 1953. 'rhe first paragrap<l of that communication states that " the Jan t:iangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the l:tam Rajya Parishad have started :n1 unlawful campaign in sympathy with the Praja Parishad movement of Kashmir for defiance of the law, involving violence and threat to the maintenance of public order" as evidenced by the subparagraphs which folluw. '!'he incidents referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (l) are said to have ranged from the 4th to the 10th March, 1953, the date on which the petitioner was arrested, but they do not directly implicate the petitioner. '!.'hey merely give particulars of the alleged unlawful activities of the three political organizations referred to above. Subparagraph (m) is important, as on it is founded the first contention of Mr. Veda Vyas, the learned counsel for the petitioner. It runs as follows:-

p. 709

"(m) On the evening of 11th March, 1953, there was very heavy brick-batting indulged in by or at the instance of Jan l:langh and Mahasabha workers in t:iabzimandt when the police dispersed a Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha procession and several persons including policemen, journalists and other nonofticials were injured. An assault was made on Miss Mridula 8arabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her associates received a stab injury."

p. 709

It will be noticed that the incidents related in the sub-paragraph are alleged to have taken place on the 11th March, the day after the petitioner was arrested and detained. Mr. Veda Vyas relies upon it as showing that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the alleged necessity for the detention of the petitioner as, if he had done so, he could not possibly have referred to what bappened on the 11th March as a ground of justification for what he did on the 10th. The so called grounds on which the detention is said to have been based must, it was suggested, have been prepared by some clerk or subordinate in the District Magistrate's office and mechanically signed by him. The learned Attorney-General explained that the incidents of the 11th March were referred to not as a ground for the arrest and detention of the petitioner, but merely as evidencing the unlawful activities of the movement organized by the Jan Sangh and the other political bodies of which the petitioner was an active member. The explanation is hardly convincing and we cannot but regard this lapse in chronology as a mark of carelessness. Notwithstanding repeated admonition by this Court that due care and attention must be bestowed upon matters involving the liberty of the individual, it is distressing to find that such matters are dealt with in a careless and casual manner. In view, however, of the statements in the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate before us that he carefully perused and considered the reports and materials placed before him by responsible Intelligence Officers and that he was fully satisfied that the petitioner was assisting the movement and agitation started by the Jan Sangh etc., we are not prepared to hold that the District Magistrate failed to apply his mind to the relevant considerations before he made the detention order as suggested for the petitioner.

p. 710

The second contention raised by Mr. Veda Vyas is more formida.ble. As already stated, the first para.graph of the statement of grounds, while it sets out the unlawful activities of the three political bodies, does not directly implicate the petitioner in any of them. The second paragraph shows how the petitioner was concerned in those activities. It begins by stating " The following facts show that you are personally helping and actively participating in the above mentioned movement which has resulted in violence and threat to maintenance of public order". Then follow four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) which refer to private meetings of the Working Committee of the Jan Sangh in January and February, 1953, where, it is alleged, it was decided to launch and intensify the campaign and the petitioner made inflammatory speeches. Sub-paragraph (e) on which this contention is based runs thus:

pp. 710–711

"(e) You have been organising the movement by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as President of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao," a local area in Delhi. It is argued by Mr. Veda Vyas that this ground is extremely vague and gives no particulars to enable the petitioner to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and thus infringes the constitutional safeguard provided in article 22 (5). Learned counsel relies on the decision in Atma Rani Vaidya's case(') where this Court held by a majority that the person detained is entitled, in addition to the right to have the grounds of his detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars "as full and adequate as the circumstances permit " furnished to him so as to enable him to make a representation against the order of dete,ution. It was further held that the sufficiency of the particulars conveyed in the "second communication" is a justiciable issue, the test being whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation "which, on being considered, may give relief to the detained person". On this interpretation of article 2<l (5) two questions arise for consideratiGn : first, whether the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph {e) is so vague as to render it difficult, if not impossible, for the tioner to make an adequate representation appropriate authorities, and second, if it is whether on vague ground among others, which clear and definite, would infringe the constitutional safeguard provided in article 22(5).

pp. 711–712

On the first question, the Attorney-General that the grounds must be read as a whole and the ground. mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) reasonably be taken to mean, that the petitioner organizing tbe movement by enrolling volunteers the 4th to 10th March in the area known as Hindu Rao. This interpretation is plausible, petitioner, who is a layman not experienced interpretation of documents, can hardly be expected without legal aid, which is denied to him, to interpret the ground in the sense explained by the Attorney- Geueral. Surely, it is up to the detaining authority to make his me:i.ning clear beyond doubt, leaving the person deta,iued to his own resource for interpreting the grounds. We must, therefore, that the the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 is vague in the sense explained

p. 712

Ou the second question, there is uo considered pronouncement by this Court, though in some cases it would appear to have been assumed, iu the of any argument, that one or two vague grounds could not affect the validity of the detention there are other sufficiently clear and defini~e grounds 1io support the detention. Mr. Veda Vyas now that even though the petitioner might succeed in rebutting the other grounds to the satisfaction of Advisory Board, his represe1itation might fail to conviction so far as the ground mentioned paragraph (e) was concerned in tbe absence of culars which he could rebut and the Advisory might, therefore, recommend the continuance detention. The argument is not without force, as possibility suggested cannot altogether be ruled 'rhe Attorney-General drew attention to the amendment of section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act as a result of which the petitioner would be entitled to be heard in person before the Advisory Board if he so desires aud, it was said, that he would thus have the opportunity of getting tbe necessary particulars through the Board who could call upon the appropriate Government to furnish particulars if the Board thought that the demand for them was in the circumstances just and reasonable. The petitioner would thus suffer no hardship or prejudice by reason of sufficient particulars not having been already furnished to him. 'rhe question however is not whether the petitioner will in fact be prejudicially affected in the matter of securing his release by his representation, but whether his coustitutional safeguard has been infringed. v'Preventive detention is a serious invasiou of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Comt. In this case, the petitioner has tho right, under article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him." We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of article 22. 'l'J'hat not ha viug beer1 done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement of ground,;, the petillioner's detention cannot be held to be il1 accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21. 'l'he petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.

pp. 712–713

Petition allowed. Agent for t.he petitioner: Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.

p. 713