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Supreme Court of India

BAILOCHAN KARAN versus BASANT KUMARI NAIK AND ANR.

Decided
2 February 1999
Judges listed
M. SRINIVASAN, U.C. BANERJEE (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 345 · 1999 INSC 35
Also cited as
  • (1999) 2 SCC 310 (4 citing judgments)
  • AIR 1999 SC 876 (2 citing judgments)

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The Court's text

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The only question in this case is whether the suit filed by the respondents was barred by limitation. The relevant facts necessary for that purpose are that the appellant herein was the legitimate son of one Prahalad who in turn was son of Bagru Karan who was the owner of the property. The said Bagru Karan died and was survived by his wife, son Prahalad and daughter Pancha Dangen. Bagru Karan's widow executed a Will in favour of the daughter Pancha Dangen bequeathing the entire property to her. The latter sold the property on 6.2.1953 to the first plaintiff. The plaintiffs came into possession from that date. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs against the present appellant alleging that he was an illegitimate son of Prahalad, the son of Bagru Karan and that he had forcibly trespassed in the land in 1971. The Trial Court held that the appellant was a legitimate son of Prahalad. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was void as the sale in favour of the Vendor's mother was itself void. The Appellate Court confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. On Second Appeal the High Court remanded the matter for ascertaining the date on which the appellant attained majority.

p. 346, margin B

2

The Trial Court found that the appellant was born in the year 1945. The Trial Court held that the suit had been filed by the plaintiff before the expiration of 12 years from the date the appellant attained majority. Consequently the plaintiff had not perfected title by adverse possession.

p. 346, margin E

3

On Second Appeal the High Court has reversed the conclusions by the Triai Court on the question of limitation and held that if the appellant was born in 1945, he attained majority in 1966 on completion of 21 years and he could have instituted a suit for recovery of possession within three years therefrom, i.e., 1969. The suit by the present plaintiff was filed in 1971 which was beyond the said period of three years. Consequently the High Court held that the appellant could not have filed any suit for recovery of possession and the ~Jaintiffs had perfected title to the property by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act. In the result the High Court of the cessation of the disability. Consequently the right to file a suit of the appellant got expired at the end of three years from the date of his attaining majority, whether it was 1963 or 1966. In this case it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the appellant attained majority ih 1966 on completion of 21 years or in 1963 on completion of 18 years as it is not relevant for the purposes of this case. The plaintiffs, therefore, perfected their title by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act.

pp. 346–348, margin F

7

Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Orissa High Court in Ke/uni Dei v. Kanhei Sahu & Ors., (1971) 37 Cuttack Law Times 178. The judgment in that case does not contain any reasoning with regard to the question of limitation. The High Court has held that the suit in that case was not barred by limitation. It is unnecessary for us to consider that judgment in detail. Suffice it to say that the same will not help the appellant in the present case.

p. 348, margin B

8

The view taken by the High Court is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.

p. 348, margin C