THE NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER CO., LTD. & OTHERS versus K. SHREEPATHIRAO

S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave. .The appellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. (hereinaftc1' referred to as the Company), a public limited company having its registered office at Nagpur in Madhya Pradesh, its Manager, and Assistant Manager. The respondent, Shreepathi Hao, joined the service of the Company as a typist on a salary of Its. 30 per month in .July, 1936. He rose in rank from time to time and was appointed Deputy Head Clerk in 1947 in the grade of Rs. 120-10-225. Since 1952 he has been receiving a basic sa!My of Rs. 245 per month. On Xovember 28, 1955, an ex plan a ti on was called for from him with regard to the issue of certain bills to consumers of electricity called "high tension consumers.", without having certain "notes for the information of consumers" printed at tlre back of the bills. The respondent submitted his explanation on the next clay, marking a copy thereof to one of the directors of the Company. On December 2, 1955, he was again asked to 0xplain why he marked a copy of his explanation to one-of the directors. The respondent submitted an explanation in respect of this matter also. On the same date, he was again' asked to explain as to how and why certain "double adjtistments" had been made in the accounts of 1954 relating to the consumers' department the Company, the allegation being that a sum Rs. 1,05,894-7. 7 which represented the amount of bills of the Central ]{ailwav had been deducted twice in accounts. The resp01;dent submitted an explanation on December 3, 1955, in which he said that the charge was vague and that_. after 1949, he was not in way concerned with the preparation of summaries and annual statements of accounts of the consumers' department. On December 5, 1955, an order of susper:sion was made agaimt the respondent which stated that the order was to take immediate effect and to remain in force until further orders, pending some investigation. against the respondent. Two clays later, December 7, 1955, a memorandum was served on respondent terminating his services with effect from January 31, 1956. The memorandum, so far as relevant for our purpose, read-

pp. 464–465

" We hereby give you notice under Standing Order 16(1) that your services will stand terminated as from 31st January, 1956.·

p. 465

The. Company's Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of Company to disclose reasons for termina.ting your services." On December 19, 1955, a notice was served ou Company on behalf of the. respondent whe,rein it stated that the order of suspension dated December 5, 1955, a.nd the order of termination dated December' 1955, were illegal and ultra vire8 and a request made to withdraw the said orders and reinstate respondent within 24 hours, failing which the respondent said that he would take legal actimt int.lie rnatter. On December 26, 1955, the Company sent a reply the notice denying the allegations, and the Company further stated that it had no desire to enter into disc.vssion with the respondent as to the propriety the orders passed.

p. 465

On J anuarY. 2, 1956, the respomlent filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Co.nstitution in. the High C<1urt at Nagpur in which he prayed for the issue of appropria~e writs or di~ecti_ons quashing the orders of suspons10n and termmat10n dated· December 5, 1955, and December 7, 1955, respectively and asking for certain other reliefs. This petitio.n was heard by a learned single Judge on certain preliminary objections raised by the present appelfants, and, by an order dated April 14, 1956, he upheld the preliminary objection'S and dismissed the petition. The preliminary objections taken were these: ·it was urged that· the service of the respondent was terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the Company, a:pproved by the relevant authorities.under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (XX of 1946), hereinafter referred to as the central Act, and also under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (0. P. and Berar Act XXIII of 194 7), hereinafter called the local Act ; and if the respondent had any grievance against the said Standing Orders, his only remedy was to get the Standing Orders amended as provided for in the relevant Act, but he had no right to move the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the orders passed against him or for reinstatemC'ut, etc. Alternatively, it was urged that if the. Standing Orders did not apply in the case of the respondent as was the respondent's case, then the ordinary law of master and servant applied, and the only remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company ·in damages for wrongful di1nnissal. On these prelimina~-y objections the learned Judge held (1) that the respondent was not an employee within the meaning of the Stqnding Orders and therefore his case was not governed by the Standing Orders ; (2) that the relationship between the appellants and the respondent was contractual and not statutory and the remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company in damages for wrongful dismissal; and (3) as for amendment of the Standing Orders so as to include the respondent and persons in his category, the only remedy open tel' the respondent was to take action under the relevant Act by approaching a recognised union to move in the matter.

pp. 465–466, margin A

On the dismissal of his petition, the respondent pre.ferred .an appeal under cl. lO of the Letters ~a~e.nt. Th1s appeal was heard and allowed by a D1v1s10n Bench on September 26, 1956, on the findings that (1) the Standing Orders did not apply to the. respondent, though he was an employee within the meaning of that expression in s, 2 (1) of the local Act ; (2) the' cond'itions of the respondent's service were governed by the provisions of the local Act and on a breach thei'eof, the respondent had a right to move the High Court for appropriate orders under Art. 226 of the Constitution; and (3) as 'the termination of the service of the respondent was without statutory authority, it must be vacated. The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal, quashed the orders of suspension and termination.of service and declared that the respondent continued to be an employee of the Company on terms which were applicable _to him on the date of his suspension, namely, December 5, 1955. There was also a direction to the Company to pay back wages to the respondent.

p. 467

The appellants herein then moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the order of the Division Bench, dated September 26, 1956. The present appeal has been broaght in pursuance of the order granting special leave to the appellants.

p. 467

The first and foremost question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the Standing Orders of the Company apply to the respondent. We have already stated-and it is not in dispute_:.that the Standing Orders were approved by the certifyililg officer under the provisions of the central Act and by the Labour Commissioner under s. 30 of the local Act. It is necessary to explain here the general scheme of the provisions of the two Acts under which the Standing Orders were approved. Under the central Act, the expression " Standing Orders " means rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule, and s. 3 requires that within six months from the date on which the central Act l'!ecomes applicable to an industrial establishment the employer shall submit to the certifying officer five copies of the draft Standing Orders proposed by him . . . for adoption in his industrial establishment. Sub-section (2) of s. 3 lays down that provision shall be made

pp. 467–468

I [ ft t • l h d l

p. 468

sue ra ever)' matter set ou t e u e which nrny be applicable to the industrial establishment and where model Standing Orders have be0n prescribed, the draft shall be, far as practicable, in conformitv with such model. The Schedule refers to the matt~rs which are to be provided by Standin~ Orders, rmd item 8 of the Schedule relates to "termination of employment, and the' notice thereof to be given by employer and workman". We nrny state here that the central Act contains a definition of "workman" which, at the material time in this case, meant any person employed in any industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual m· clerical, 1'1bour for hire or reward, but did not include anv member of the armed forces. Sections 4 to IO of th.e central Act deal with (a) conditions for certification of Standing Orders, (b) certification of Standing Ordern, (c) appeals, (d) date of operation of Standing Orders, (e) register of Standing Orders, (f) posting of Standing Orders and (g) duration and modification of Standing Orders. There are similar provisions in the local Act, Chapter IV of which deals with .Standing Orders. Sub-section (1) of s. 30 of the local Act lays down-

p. 468

" Every employer, in respect of any industry to which this Act has been made applicable under subsection (:3) of section 1, shall, within two months of the date of such notification, submit to the Labour Commissioner for approval, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule I. " Item 8 of Sc:hepnle I of the local Act is again " termination of employment, notice to be given by employer and employee". The other sub-sections of s. 30 lity down the procedure to be followed for the approval of Standing Oeders by the Labour Commissioner, apJ)eal · by an aggrieved person, etc. Sections 31 and 32 lay down the procedure for an amendment of the Standing Orders either at the instance of the employer or at the . . . instance of a representative of employees. It is worthy of note that sub-s. (1) of s. 30 requires every employer

pp. 468–469

· h L b C · · f th t su b m1t to t e a our omm1ss10ner a copy o · e Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule I. The local Act defines the expression "employee" and, at the relevant time, it mfant any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry. It is worthy of note that the definition of " employee " in the local ~!\ct corresponds more or less to the definition of " workman " under the central Act. There are some minor differences in the definition of the two expressions in the two Acts, but with those differences we are nQt concerned in the present case.

p. 469

The Standing Orders with which we are concerned in the present case came into force on November 14, 1951, 1111d it is convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant Standing Orders. Standing Order no. 2 defines certain expressions used in the Standing Orders. It states-

p. 469

" In these Orders, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context :-

p. 469

(a) " employees" means all persons, male or female, employed in the Office or Mains Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the Company, either at Nagpur or at Wardha whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters.

p. 469

(b) "The Manager" means the person appointet'l. as such and includes the Assistant Manager and in relation to \Vardha establishment :•the Resident Engineer ".

p. 469

( c) "Ticket" includes a ;Card, pass o_; token.

p. 469

(d) "·workman" means such categories ofetnployees as may from time to time be declared to be " \Vorkman " by the Management ". Standing Order no. 3 classifies employees into certain categories and Standing Order no. 4 deals with tickets. In substance, it says that every workman, permanent .• or temporary, shall have a ticket or card, and apprentice shall have an apprentice card; the tickets

pp. 469–470

h ll b d

p. 470, margin D

cards issue s. a e surren ered when the workman is discharged or ceases to belong to the class employment for which the card or ticket is issued. is to be noticed that under the definition clause" workman" means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be workmen by the management and Standing Ord~r no. 4 makes it clear that every workman, permanent or temporary, will have a ticket. " Standing Order no. lG deals with termination of employment, and cl. (I.) thereof, relevant fo:r: our purpose, must be quoted in full-.

p. 470, margin D

"J<'or terminating the employment of a·pcrmanent employee, a notice in writing shall be given either the employer or - the employee, giving one caJ.endar nionth's notice. The reasons for the termination the services ·will be 'cop:tmunicated to the employee writing, if he so desires at _the time of discharge, unless such a communication, in the opinion of the Management, may directly or indirectly fay the Company and the Management .or the person signing the communication open to criminal or civil proceedings at the instance of the employee, or the Company's Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the i.msiil.es's' ot' the Company to disclose the reasons and orders' in wdtin'g. "

p. 470, margin D

~ow, it is 'i1ot i'ri dispute that the respondent is ' workman '. with!n the ineaning of the Central Act and an 'employee ' as defined in the local Act: The eontroversy before us is as. to. whether .. he is '.employee' within the meaning oftHe Standing \:)rders . .l\drp'.ittedly,'h~ ticket has been issued' .to the respoi;l: dent' 'by the Company; his_ ti_cket number mprnot, therefore, oo included in the departmental_ rµ11ster: The learfied Judges of the High Court held tji.at inclusion' df the name and tick.et number in the depart; mental mu'ster was an essential characteristic of ' employee ' as defined for the purp6se of the St!J:nding Orders, and the ·mere fact of employnierlt in the Office, Mains Department;!Stores, Power House·br l{eceiving S~ation of the Compa.iry was not, enough to make . . person so employed an '·employee ' within the meaning of th? Sta:rrdirig Or~et,s; '~~d. as the r~spon~ent did not fulfil the necessary 9ond1t10n of ha vmg his name and ticket number incli1d.ed ' in:' ~he departmental muster, he was not an 'employee' as' 'ilefined for the Standing Orders, which did not therefore apply to him. On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that regard beti;ig had to the context and the entire body of the Standing Orders, the aforesaid view of the High Court is not correct, and on a proper construction, inclusion of the name and ticket number in the departmental lnuster is not an essential characteristic of an ' employee' as defined for the Standing Orders. It is rightly pointed oub that if.the possessionof a ticket and a ticket number is taken as an essential characteristic of an ' empJ..oyee ', then there is hardly any difference between an 'employee' and a 'workman' as defined in the Standing Orders; because a 'workman' ineans such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be workmen, and under Standing Order no. 4 all workmen must have tickets. If a person employed by the company must have a ticket before he can be an employee, and if workmen are ·such catego-· ries of employees as have tickets, the distinction between the two disappears andjt is difficult to under-· stand why two definitions were necessary. .

pp. 470–471, margin A

On a consideration, however, of the subject o( context of the Standing Orders, read in their entirety and in harmony with one another, it becomes at once clear why two definitions are necessary and what is the disti1iction between the two classes-' employees• and 'workmen '-in the "Standing Orders. The ex-· pression 'employee'. denotes a larger group-namely, all persons, male or female, who are employed in the Office, Mains Department, Stores, Powe.i House, or Heceiving Station of the Company, either at Nagpur or , \Vardha. ' \V orkmen ' denotes a smaller group, viz., such categories of employees as have been declared ·to be workmen, and who must have a ticket. Such a· distiml'tion is dearly intelligible in an industrial. establishment, where for security and other reasons a system of tickets or passes is necessary for .thos~ wbJJ· . . work in the Power House or Mains Department or other places where essential machinery is installed while h h 1 · 1 ff" l .

pp. 471–472

ers, sue as t e c er1ca sta , 111a) 'vor r an office building where security demands are either non. existent or much less insistent. This distinction means that all 'workmen ' are 'employees', but all 'employees' are not ' workmen' for the purpose of the Standing Orders, and the inclusion of ticket numbers in the departmental musters will be applicab.le to those t>mployces only to whom tickets have been issued; but such inclusion is not an essential characteristic of an employee.

p. 472, margin H

Let us now sec if such a distinction is consistent with the Standing Orders as a whole. Standing Order no. 3, which classifies employees, defines a probationer in cl. (c) and says that a probationer means an em;iloyee who is appointed in a·clear vacancy on probation for a period not exceeding twelve months, etc. Standing Order no. 4 does not require the issue of n ticket to probationer; yet a probntioner is an employee. It is thus obvious that the Standing Orders do make distinction between 'employees' and ' workmen', and there may also be employees who lrn ve no tickets. Some of the Standing Orders apply to workmen only, c. g., Standing Orders 12, 13, 14 and 15. Other Slnnding Orders apply to all employees, whether they are workmen or not. Standing Order no. 16 falls in the latter category; it applies to all employees.

p. 472, margin H

Standing Order no. 8 (b), we think, makes the position still more clear. It says-

p. 472, margin A

" Any employee, who after marking his at.tenclance or presenting his ticket, card, or token, as the case may be, is found absent from his proper place of work during working hours without permission or without an" sufficient reason, shall be liable to be treated as absent for the period of his absence." lf every employee has to have a ticket, it is difficult to understand why this Standing Order should make distinction between an employee who marks his r;ttendance and another who presents his t·iclcet, carrl or token. Such a distinction is easily understandable when some e111ployees do .not posses~ a ticket, card or token, so that they merely mark their attendance; while those who possess a ticket, card or token present it.

pp. 472–473, margin A

It has been suggested that Standing Order no. 4 not exhaustive in the matter of issue of tickets; it talks of an issue ofa ticket to every permanent work-

p. 473

· ) man, a car· d to every b dl a wor ;;:man, a temporary t~clrnt. to every temporary workman, and an apprcntice card to every apprentice. It does not prescribe the issue of a pass or token, though the definition of a 'ticket' includes a pass or token. The suggestion further is that Standing Order no. 2 (a) itself authorises the issue of tickets to other employees, so that there may be one kind of tickets issued to workmen under Standing Order no. 4 and another kind of tickets to other employees under Standing Order no. 2 (a). On this.view, it is suggested that the alternatives mentioned in l::ltanding Order no. 8 (b) really amount to an option given to an employee either to mark his attendance or present his ticket. lt i8, however, difficult to understand the necessity of an option of this kind when every employee must have a ticket, particularly when the exercise of such an option is likely to defeat the very purpose for which tickets are issued in an industrial establishment. \Ve do not, however, think that the case of the respondent is in any way strengthened by holding that Standing Order no. 2 (a) itself authorises the issue of tickets to employees other than workmen. Even on that construction, the failure of the. Company to issue tickets under Standing Order no. 2 (a) will not deprive the employees of their real status as employees and of the benefit 'of the Standing Orders. The direction for the issue of tickets will, in that view of the Standing Order, be an enabling provision only and not an essential characteristic of an employee. Further, Stttnding Order no. 4 provides for the surrender of tickets issued thereunder but Standing Order no. 2 (a), if it is construed as enabling the Company to issue tickets, makes no pro1~sion for the surrender of tickets when the em. ployee ceases to be an employee. This absence of any provision for surrender applicable to such tickets

p. 473

clearly implies that issue of tickets is not contem, Uec-plated by the ·Standing Order.no. 2 (a) itself.·· ·

p. 474

On·behalf of the· )'espondent, howBver,· the· mam argument has been of a different character. It been argued that there need not be one set of Standing Orders for all emphoyees, and·the Standing Orders in question being confinecl to. those employees to whom tickets had heen issued, the respondent who had ticket was outside their purview and the result that the Company had committed a breach of statutory· provision in s. 30 of the local Act in sense that no Standing Orders had been made re,spect of the respondent and employees like him whom tickets had not been issued. It has been argued that, therefore, no action. could be taken against respondent either under the Standing Orders or ~ven under the ordinary law. of master and servant. .ire unable to accept this argument as correct. lrnve pointed out that th" Standing O,rders themselves make a distinction between ' employees ' and 'workmen', and there nrny also be employees who have tickets. To hold that the Standing Orders apply those employees only to whom tickets have been issued will make employees synonymous with workmen-a result negatived by two separate definitions given in Standing Order no. 2. The central Act well as the local Act contemplate the making of Standing Orders for all employees in respect of matters which are required to be dealt with by Standing Orders. The Standing Orders in question were not objected to as being defective or incomplete by workmen, and they have been approved by the appropriate authority and they must be construed with reference to their subject or context. ln the absence of compelling reasonE> to the contrary, it should be held that they apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been made. Vv e see no compelling reasons for holding that the Standing Orders do not apply to the. respondent. In our view, and having regard to the subject or context of the Standing Orders, the wtirds "whose names and ticket numbers arc included in the dep,ftrtmental musters" in Standing Order no. 2 (a) do . . S.0.:R. not lay down any essential characteristic of an employee and are applicable only in cases where tickets have been issued to an employee. The essential

pp. 474–475

. h d · · f 1 · 1 content o t e e f imt1011 o an emp oyee is emp oyment in the Office, Mains Department, eto., of the Company either at Nagpur or W ardha, and that of a workman the necessary declaration by the Company which would entitle him to a ticket under Standing Order no. 4. ·There is also another relevant consideration which must be borne in mind in construing the Standing Orders in question. Section 30 of the local Act imposes a statutory obligation on the employer to make Standing Orders in respect of all his employees and a breach of the statutory obligation involves a criminal liability. That ~eing so, the court would be justified, if it can reasonably d9 so, to construe the Standing Orders so as to make them consistent with the compliance of the said statutory bbligation.

p. 475

We are not unmindful of the ptihciple that in construing a statutory provision or rule,·_ every word occurring therein must b.e given its -prop'er meaning ana 'wE;iight. Th_e necessity of such an interpretation is all the more "important in a definition clause. 'But even a defii:iition clause must derive its meaning frorn the context or subject. In Cortis v. The Kent W ate!f: works Company (1), the question for consideration was the interpretation of the appeal dlause in an Act for Paving, Cleansing, Lighting, etc., Of the Town and Plirish of vVoolwich (47 Geo. III, Sess.'2~ cap. CXI). By the "16th section of the statute, "the commission<irs are to .make rates upon all and every the person or persons who (fo or . shall hold, occupy' possess, etb:' any land within "tlie p:;i.rish ". The statute also gave a tight of appeal to anj r:Jerson or persons-. aggtieved by any rate, but the appeal clause required tHe person or perl sons appealing against' 'a rate to 'enter in't'6'd'recognis" ance; the question was if this req'l'.lirement w'as intended -to exclude corporations' f'r611f the purview of· the appeal "clau~e, as corporations, it' «·a·s urged, cannot ettt~r ititb 'a recbgnisande. In interpreti:iig the appeal cla u~~; Bayley · J. observed- . · - . .

p. 475

"But assuming that they cannot enter into a rceoguizance, vet if thev n.re j)ersons car)able of being

p. 476

by and appealmg agamst a rate, I should say that that part of the clause which gives the appeal applies to all persons capable of appealing, and that the other part of the clause which requires a recognizance to be enkred into applies only to those persons

p. 476

bl "·ho are capa e of entering into a recognizance, hnt is inapplicable to those who are not." The same principle of interpretation was applied in Perumal Gounclan v. 1'he 1'hiruinala.ra.yapuram Jana .. nukoola. Dhanasekha.ra Sangha Niclhi ('), in construing the Explanation to 0. XXXIII, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which says intei· alia that "a person is a pauper ............ whcn he is not. entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his nece~sary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit". The que.~tion was if the aforesaid provision applied to companies. It was held that it would be wrong to construe the provision to mean that 011ly persons who possess wearing apparel can sue as paupers. v\' e. are of the view that the same rule of construction should apply in the present case, and the words "whose names ai1cl ticket numbers are included· in the department.al musters" occurring in Standing Order no. 2(a) should be read as "whose names and ticket numbers, if any, are included in the departmental musters" and should apply in the case of those employees only who possess tickets and whose ticket nnmbern are capable of being entered in departmental musters; they are not intended to exclude employees who do not possess tickets or to whom tickets have not been issued and consequently whose names only are so entered.

p. 476

The learned J uclges of the High Court were influenced hy the. circumstance that in an earlier case D. 0. Dungore v. S. S. Danclige (Miscellaneous Petition No. 134 of 1954 decided by the same High Court on September 23, 1955) the Company took np the stand that the Standing Orders applied to employees to whom tickets had been issued-a stand different from and inconsistent with that taken in the present case.

p. 476

S') It may be pointed out, however, that D. C. Dungore of the earlier case was not an employee within ·the meanmg of the relevant Act, and there could be no Standing Orders in respect of his co1iditions of service. Moreover, in the matter of construction of a stp,tutory provision no (1uestion of estoppel arises, and the learneel Judges had pointed out that the respondent himself

pp. 476–477

d" 0 l 1 d thoug h t t l lat t e h otan mg re ers app ie · to a employees. vVe have rested our decision as to the applicability of the Standing Orders not what the appelhnts or the respondent thought at one time or another, but on a true construction of the Standing Orders thcm;;el ves, including the definition clause in Standing Order no. 2(a).

p. 477, margin C

We take the view that the Standing Orders apply to th~ respondent. This is really decisive of the appeal, because. if the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order no. 16(1), the writ application which the respondent made to the High Court must fail.

p. 477, margin C

The learned Attorney-General appearing for the appellants addressed us on the scope and ambit of Art. 226 of the Constitution, and he contended that even if the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed by his pri va,tc employer, the proper remedy was by means of a suit and not by invoking the special writ jurisdiction of the High Comt. These contentions raise i~portant questions, but do not think that we are caUed upon to decide them in this case.

p. 477, margin C

Lastly, it has been urged on behalf of the responr dent that even if we hold that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent, we should remand the case to the High Court for a decision on merits of other points raised by the respondent, because .the question whether the Standing Orders apply or not was treated as a preliminary issue by the High Courb and no decision was given on other points. Vile asked learned Advocate for the respondent what other points remain for det:ision on his writ application, once it is held that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent .and o• his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order no. 16(1). Learned Advocate then

pp. 477–478, margin C

d' t St d' 0 d 18 h" h "d re1erre us o an mg r er no. , w prov1 es

p. 478

I"'· b" ior pena. ties for nnsconduct, and su m1tted that the provisions thereof have not been complied with by the appellants. He particularly referred to cl. (c) of Standing Order no. 18 and submitted that the order of suspension passed against the respondent was in violation of the safeguards mentioned therein. The short answer to this argument is th:it no penalty for misconduct has been imposed on the respondent under Standing Order no. 18. The Company paid his salary to the respondent from the date of suspension to January 31, 1956, which also showed that no order was passed by way of punishment for misconduct. The Company chose to terminat<? the service of the respondent in accordance with Standing Order ifo. 16, and did not think fit to proceed against the respondent for any alleged misconduct, and it was open to the Company to do so. So far as Standing Order no 16. is concerned, all the requirements thereof have been complied with. That being the position, no other point remains for decision in the present case.

p. 478

The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated September 26, 1956, are set aside and the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed. In view of the stand which the appellants had taken in the earlier case with regard to the Standing Orders, we think it proper to say in this case that the parties l]ll\St bear their own costs throughout.

p. 478

Appeal allowed . ..

p. 478