Certo Is this judgment real?
Beta, Supreme Court only. We check Supreme Court of India judgments only for now: a High Court citation reads "Not in our corpus", which never means it does not exist.

Supreme Court of India

MESSRS. KAMARHATTY CO. LTD. versus SHRI USHNATH PAKRASHI

Decided
21 May 1959
Judges listed
BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1960] 1 S.C.R. 473 · 1959 INSC 94
Also cited as
  • AIR 1959 SC 1399 (2 citing judgments)

Learned from how other judgments cite this one, in their text or in the official Supreme Court Reports' lists of cases they refer to: each is cited this way by at least two judgments, and at least twice as often as any other citation to this judgment in that report. We hold no commercial reporter's text, only these citation strings.

Cited by

We found no other Supreme Court judgment we hold that cites this one.

Counted only in the Supreme Court judgments we hold whose text we could read, not in High Court judgments. We match each citation to a judgment automatically, so a citation we cannot match is not counted. "Cited" says only that a judgment refers to this one, not whether it followed, distinguished or overruled it.

The Court's text

Paragraphs from our copy of the Supreme Court Reports print, with the Court's own paragraph numbers, the printed page and, where printed, the margin letter. The Court did not number this judgment's paragraphs, so they are listed by page. Link to paragraph N with #para-N.

Unnumbered paragraph

WANCHOO J.-This appeal by special leave agai11st the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India is limited to the question whether an order of reinstatement can be made on an application under s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). The brief facts necessary for the decision of this question are these. The appellant is a Jut!J Mill. There was a dispute pending before an Industrial Tribunal between a number of jute mills in West Bengal and their employees, and the appellant was ·a party to that dispute. During the pendency of that dispute, the appellant laid-off the respondent who was an employee in the ration shop maintained by the appellant from July 19, 1954, as rationing of food-stuff came to an end from July IO, 1954. The reason for the lay-off was _that the ration shop was closed following the end of rationing. This resulted in the staff in that shop becoming surplus. Consequently,· nine persons were selected for retrenchment on the principle of "last come first go", and the respondent was one of them. The appellant also applied under s. 33 of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to retrench the respondent along with others. Shortly before t_he application under s. 33, the respondent had applied under s. 33-A of the Act and his case was that there was no reason to make any retrenchment on account of the closure of the ration shop and that he was at any rate longer in service than others who had been retained and therefore the principle of" last come first go " had not been followed. It was also said that the respondent bad been laid-off as he was an active worker of the union and as such was not in the good books of the appellant. It was, therefore, prayed that the respondent should be allowed full wages and amenities since the so-called lay-off, which was nothing more nor less than retrenchment and that he should be reinstated.

pp. 473–474

Unnumbered paragraph

The Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the lay-off was justified because of the closure of the ration shop' and gave permission to the appellant to retrench the respondent on the principle of" last come first go". The respondent appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. He did not urge there that there was no ne.cessity for retrenchment at all. What was urged there was that the Industrial Tribunal was wrong in holding that the principle of" last come first go" had been followed in this case. The Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the respondent had been in service much longer than others who had

pp. 474–475

Unnumbered paragraph

. l f' l een retained and therefore the prmcip e o " ast come first go" had been violated. In consequence, the appeal was allowed and the permission to retrench the respondent was refused. The Appellate Tribunal also ordered that the respondent should be reinstated in service without any break in the continuity of service and the order of the appellant in laying him off and discharging him in effect from July 19, 1954 was set ai:.ide. Thereupon the appellant came to this Court and was granted special leave on the limited question set out above.

p. 475

Unnumbered paragraph

In our opinion, the answer to the limited question on which the special leave has heen grantBd can only be one in view of the language of 33.A. That section lays down that. "where an employer contravenes tho provisions of s. 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing to the tribunal and on receipt of such complaint the tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of the A<:t and sl111ll submit its awar<l to the appropriate government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." It is thus clear that a complaint under s. 33-A of the Act is as good as a reference under s. 10 of the Act and the tribunal has all the powers to deal with it as it. would have in dealing with a reference under s. 10. It follows, therefore, that the tribunal has the power to make such order as to relief as may be appropri11t,e in the case and as it can make if a dispute is rcforrcd to it relating to the dismissa.l or discharge of a workman. In such a dispute it is open to the tribunal in prnper cases to order reinstatement. Therefore a complaint under s. 33-A being in the nature of a dispute referred to a tribunal under s. 10 of the Act, it is certainly within its power to order reinstatement on such complaint, if the complaint is that the employee has been dismissed or discharged in breach of s. 33.

p. 475, margin B

Unnumbered paragraph

Learned counsel for the appellant wanted to argue that this was not a case of discharge or dismissal but of lay-off. We did not permit him to raise this argument because the special leave was limited only to the question set out above. The answer to that question has already been indicated above and on that answer the appeal must fail. We therefore dismiss the appeal, but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs of this Court.

p. 476

Unnumbered paragraph

Appeal dismissed. THE MANAGEMENT OF HOTEL IMPERIAL, NEW DELHI & OTHERS

p. 476

Unnumbered paragraph

v.

p. 476

Unnumbered paragraph

HOTEL WORKERS' UNION (B. P. P. B. and

p. 476

Unnumbered paragraph

K. N. w JJ.)

p. 476

Unnumbered paragraph

Industrial Dispute-Employer seeking permission to dismiss workmen as result of enquiry-Suspension of workmen pending decision of such application by Tribunal-Validity-Workmen, if entitled to wages during period of suspension-Grant of interim relief-Power of Supreme Court-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 of r947), ss. I0(4), 33.

p. 476

Unnumbered paragraph

The appellants. who were the managements of the three hotels, decided to dismiss some of their workmen who were found guilty of misconduct as a result of enquiries held by them and suspended them without pay pending the receipt of the permission of the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workmen applied to the Industrial Tribunal for the grant of interim relief pending disposal of the applications and the Tribunal granted the relief prayed for amounting to full wages and .a sum of Rs. 25 per head per month in lieu of food. The managements appealed against such grant, but the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals. The appellants came up to this court by special leave. The two questions for decision in the appeals were, (r) whether any wages were at all payable to the suspended workmen pending permission being sought under s. 33 to dismiss them and the decision of the applications under s. 33 of the Act, and, whether the Industrial Tribunal was competent to grant interim relief except by an interim award that was published.

p. 476

Unnumbered paragraph

e!d, that it was well settled that under the ordinary law of master and servant the power to suspend the servant without

p. 476, margin H