BHAGAT SINGH versus THE STATE

Au J.-This 1s an appeal against the judgment of the High Court at Patiala upholding the conviction and ·sentence of the appellant. who was tried ~y the Sessions Judge of Sangrur for the offence of 1murder ·and sentenced to deatl1.

p. 372, margin C

The prosecution story is a somewhat long and complicated one, but ignormg unnecessary details, the material facts may be shortly stated as follows:-

p. 373

On the 5th October, 1949, there was a quarrel between the appellant and one Darbara Singh, in the -course of which the appellant attacked the latter with a phawra (a cutting instrument). About that time, Gurmail Singh, the deceased person, returned to his house, which was close to the house of Darbara Singh, from his cotton field, where he had been working, in order to take tea for his companions who were still working in his field. The appellant asked Gurmail Smgh to lend him a spear to enable him to kill Darbara Singh, but since the latter refused to do so, there ensued a quarrel ·between him and tl1e aj)pellant, in the course of which d1ey exchanged abuses and grappled with each other, .and the fight was stopped only by the intervention of certain persons present at the place. It appears that the appellant was greatly affected by this quarrel, and thereafter he is said to have armed himself with a rifle and attacked 3 persons in the vicinity of Gurmail Singh's cotton field. He fired firstly at Kartar Singh, son of Sarwan Singh, while the latter was returning to his house from the field of Gunnail Singh, but he was not hurt. Soon after that, while Gurmail Singh was returning to his field after attending to his buffaloes -in a garden which was nearby, the appellant chased him and fired at him thereby causing his instantaneous .death. Lastly, he· is said to have fired at Kartar Singh, son of Bishan Singh and one Jangir Singh, while they were raising an alarm, but the bullet missed them. Upon these allegations, the following three charges were framed against him:-

p. 373

"(1) That you ...... fired a shot at Gurmail Singh deceased with rifle P. I. with the intention of killing him and caused his death and thereby committed an ·offence punishable under section 302 ..... .

p. 373

(2) That you...... fired a shot at Kartar Singh and Jangir Singh with rifle P. I. with the intention of causing death and made an attempt to cause their death .... and · thereby committed an offence punishable under section 307 ..... .

pp. 373–374

(3) That you ... : .. fired a gun-shot at Kartar Singh s/o Sarwan Singh ...... with the intention of killing him and made an attempt to cause his death and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 307 ... "

p. 374

It appears that the appellant was an Instructor in the· Home Guards, and the rifle which he is said to have used had been given to him by his supenor officer with 20 rounds. of ammunition.

p. 374

To support their verson of the· occurrence, the prose·· cution examined 3 eye-witnesses whose evidence has been accepted by both the courts below after careful scrutiny. · The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant of the second and tl;\ird . charges under section '307 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that there was no convincing evidence that the appellant intended to murder Jangir Singh· and the ·other 2 persons. He however convicted him of the first charge under sec· tion 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to death, which sentence was later confirmed by the High Court.

p. 374

The learned counsel for the appellant had very little to argue on the merits of the case, but he seriously contended that there had be.en a misjoinder of charges. which coµld not be tried together under the law, and the illegality so committed had vitiated the whole trial of the appellant. It appears that in the High Court, the line of argument on this point was somewhat different from the line adopted in -rhis court. What was stressed in that court seems to have been that thethrec incidents in respect of which tl1e appellant was charged not having happened in the course of the same transaction, they could not have been properly made the subject of one trial, . and for this contention reliance. was placed mainly on section 235 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that "if, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the· same transaction, more offences man one are committed· hy, the', s.a1Iie persoµ;•he· may, be charged with, and tried at ohe trial for, every such offence." It should be ·noted: that that ·section is only one of the exceptions to the general rule laid down in section 233 of the Code that for every distinct offence, there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately. In this court, no reference was made to section 235, but the argument was confined to the question as to whether the present case falls within another exception of section 233 which is contained in section 234 (1) which runs as follows:- . "When a ·.person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with~ and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three."

pp. 374–375

It was argued before us that even though only 3 charges have been framed against the appellant, he has in fact been tried for 4 offences and not 3. The 4 bffences are said to be these:- ( l) Committing the murder of Gurmail Singh;

p. 375, margin F

(2) Attempting to murder Kartar Singh, son of San van Singh;

p. 375, margin F

(3) Attempting to murder Jangir Singh; and · ( 4) Attempting to murder Kartar Singh, son of Sarwan Singh ;

p. 375, margin F

The learned counsel contended that the fact that the appellant has been acquitted · of the last 3 offences and convicted only of the first offence was immaterial to the point raised by him, and we have only to see whether all the offences mentioned above could be properly tried together. In our opinion, the short reply to this contention is that the second charge which relates to the appellant firing at Kartar Singh and' Jangir Singh is not a charge with respect to 2 offences but is a charge with respect to one offence only. The evidence adduced by the prosecution . shows that the appellant fired only · one bullet. The word "offence" has been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code as meaning· "any ;ict or 0111issjon :mad_e punishable/ _by anylaw for the time being in . force" .. There seems 'to be:1 nothing wrong in law to regard the single act of firing by the appellant as one offence only. On the other hand, we think that it would be,tak'ing an extremely narrow and artificial view to split it into 2 offences. There are several reported cases in which a similar view has been taken, and in our opinion they have not been incorrectly decided. In Queen Empress v. Ragu Rai('), where a person stole several bullocks from the same herdsman at the same time, it was held that only one o'ffence had been committetl. In Promotlza Nath Ray v. King Emperor('), it was held that misappropriation in regard to several account books constituted only one offence. In Johan Subama v. King Emperor('), it was held that when. an attempt to cheat a number of men by speaking to them in a bodv had been committed, one joint charge was valid. In Poonit Sing v. Madho Bhot ('), it was held that onlv one offence had been committed by a person who ga~e false i11formation in one statement to the police against 2 persons. In Sudheendra- Kumar Ray v. Emperor(''), a person who was chased by 2 constables had fired at them several times, but it seems to have· been rightly assumed that the firing did not constitute more than one offence, though the point was not specifically raised or decided. In our· opinion, there is no substance in the point raised, though we should not be unckrstood as laying down the wide proposition that in no case can a single act constitute more than one offence.

pp. 375–376, margin F

The other points urged on behalf of the appellant before us were somewhat unsubstantial points relating to the merits of the case. which it is not usual for this <:ourt to allow to be raised in appeals by special leave.

p. 376

In our opinion, this appeal is without merit, and it 1s accordingly dismissed.

p. 376

Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: R. S. Narula. Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.

p. 376

Agent for the caveator: Vidya Sagar. ~2)

p. 376