THE LORD KRISHNA SUGAR MILLS LTD., AND ANOTHER versus THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

SARKAR J.-I think these two applications should succeed. They raise the question whether the Sugar Export Promotion Act, 1958 is invalid as imposing an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' right to carry on their trade.

p. 63

Some of the petitioners are owners of factories manufacturing sugar by a process called the vacuum pan process and they carry on business as manufacturers of and dealers in sugar. For the purposes of this judgment these persons may be taken to be the petitioners. The principal respondent in these applications is the Government of India. The other respondent is the Indian Sugar Mills Association, an association of manufacturers of sugar by the vacuum pan process.

p. 63

On June 27, 1958, the Government had promulgated an Ordinance. The impugned Act was passed on September 16, 1958 repealing the Ordinance and reenacting its provisions and also providing that anything done under the Ordinance would be deemed to have been done under the Act as if it had come into force when the Ordinance had been promulgated.

p. 63

As appears from its preamble, the Act was intended to provide for the export of sugar in public interest and it set up a machinery for that purpose. I will summarise here the main provisions of the Act. Section 3 empowers the Central Government to specify a company or other body corporate as the export agency to perform the functions of that agency under the Act.

p. 63

The respondent Indian Sugar Mills Association was specified as the export agency under this section. Section 4 authorises the Central Government to fix the quantity of sugar that may be exported during any period, but the quantity so fixed for a year is not to exceed twenty per cent. of the quantity of sugar produced in India upto the month of October in that

p. 64

year. 8eotion 4 also provides that. "in fixing such 1.

p. 64

quantity the Central Government shall have regard to -(a) the quantity of sugar available in India, (b) the the quantity of sugar which, in its opinion, would be reasonably required for consumption in India, (c) the necessity for exporting sugar with a view to earning foreign exchange in the public interest." Section 5 requires the Central Government to apportion the quantity fixed under s. 4 among the owners of factories producing sugar by the vacuum pan process in proportion to the quantity produced or likely to be produced by them respectively, during the season. The quantity so apportioned to each factory is called its export quot:t. Section 6 provides that every owner of a factory shall, on demand by the export agency deliver to it sugar upto its export quota and on delivery " the owner shall retain no rights in respect of such sugar except his right to receive payment therefor under section 9." Section 7 makes provision for an additional excise duty being levied in certain circumstances on the quantity of sugar by which the sugar delivered by the owner of a factory falls short of its export quota. Section 8 states that the export agency shall export the sugar delivered to it, provided that in certain circumstances specified, the export agency may sell that sugar in India and may if it thinks fit purchase other sugar for export and for this purpose permit the owner to sell the whole or part of its export .quota at a price approved, on condition t.hat the sale proceeds are paid to it. The provisions of s. 9 are important and will be set out later. It is not necessary to refer to the other provisions of the Act.

p. 64

Soon after the Ordinance had been promulgated the Government started taking action under it. By a notification dated June 27, 1958, 50,000 tons of sugar was fixed under s. 4 as the total quantity for export for the period ending October ~ 31, 1958. Export quotas were duly fixed for all factories including those of the petitioners. The petitioners were thereafter asked by the export agency to sell the sugar and pay the saleproceeds to it.. This they failed to do. It is said by the respondents that the petitioners were also asked to deliver the sugar and this also they failed to do. The petitioners up various reasons justifying their failure to sell or deliver the requisite quantities of sugar. rt is unnecessary to refer to theRe reasons for if thn Act is invalid, as 'the petitioners contend the orders could not be made and no question would arise as to whether the petitioners had valid reasons for not carrying them out. It appears that t.l1e export agency felt that the petitioners were neither going to sell the sugar and pay the sale proceeds nor to deliver the sugar and it thereupon pointed out to the petitioners that they were hy their conduct exposing themRelves to the risk of having to pay the additional excise duty under s. 7. It was then that the present applicationR for appropriate writs restraining the respondents from taking steps under the Act were launched by the petitioners on the ground inter alia that the Act was invalid as it unreaRonably restricted the petitionerR' right to carry on their trade. I now proceed to examine the ,-alidity of this contention.

pp. 64–65

From the provisions of the Act earlier set out, it is quite clear that it requires the owner of sugar factory to part with a portion of the produce of his factory in exchange for an amount to he fixed under the provisions of s. 9. The Act therefore restricts his freedom of trade; it takes away his right to trade with the whole of his merchandise in any manner he likes. The question is, is such restriction reasonable ? .

p. 65

It is necessary now to set out the terms of s. 9 of the Act which fixes the amount which a manufacturer of sugar in entitled to receive in respect of the sugar delivered by him. Only sub-ss. (1) and (2) of this section need' be set out and they are as follows :

p. 65

Section 9.-(l) The export agency shall, at such time as it thinks fit, make to the owners who have delivered sugar to it under this Act, payments determined in accordance with the provisions hereinafter th' . . d sect10n contame .

pp. 65–66

(2) From the total sale-proceeds in respect of the quantity fixed for export under section 4 for any year, there shall be deducte~ the total expenditure incurred by the export agency m respect of the sugar, whether by way of administrative expenses or otherwise, and the balance shall be appportioned among the owners in proportion to the quantity of sugar delivered then respectively during that year.

p. 66

The substance of the matter then is that an owner of a sugar factory gets in exchange for the sugar delivered by him under the Act, a proportionate share the sale-proceeds less the Pxpenses. He has no hand in deciding at what price the goods would he sold the export agency. If they are sold for a very low p;ice, he has no right to complain. Neither has he any power to control the expenses. The exchange value that a sugar manufacturer is entitled to get under the Act for sugar delivered by him, therefore, depends entirely on the export agency. Again, under subsec. (1) of s. 9, the export agency need pay the manufacturer only at such times as it thinks fit. It may difficult to say that all these terms are reasonable.

p. 66

However that may be, there is another aspect of the question which in my view decides it. It is quite plain that as things are, sugar can be sold abroad only at loss. That clearly appears from the materials on the record and is not indeed disputed. I think it enough refer to the Objocts and Reasons of the Act and to statement in the affidavit of Shri K. P. Jain, Chief Director, Directorate of Sugar, affirmed on February 13, 1959 and filed on behalf of the Government, to show that the Act contemplated that the export of sugar made under it would result in a loss. In the Objects & Reasons of the Act it is stated,

p. 66

"With a view to earning foreign exchange it necessary to promote export of sugar. The export sugar, however, involves a loss, even if excise duty and cane cess are remitted."

p. 66, margin A

In paragraph 22 of Shri Jain's said affidavit it is stated, "If h h th t' h . d

p. 67

urt er Ray t at... e en ire sc eme envisage in the Act depends on the pooling of the losses on export by all sugar factories in India, in proportion to their export quota.''

p. 67

We then get to this that on the respondents' own case the exports under the Act can he made only at a· loss. The result therefore is that the Act compels the p()titioners to part with a portion of their merchandise at' a loss. Can the restrictions so put on the petitioners' trade by the Act then be said to be reasonable ? I conceive it is impossible to do so. It is said that the Act was passed with a view to earn foreign exchange by export of sugar. Indeed so it appears from the Objects & Reasons of the Act earlier set out and the provisions of s. 4 earlier quoted. I will agree that earning of foreign exchange is essential for the country. But I do not see that that justifies the enactment of a legislation which imposes a loss on a sugar manufacturer. It is not as if foreign exchange could not be earned without inflicting loss on the manufacturers of sugar. That indeed is not the respondents' case. The loss might have been avoided if for example, the exports were made by the grant of a subsidy, a course in fact adopted by the Government in the year 1951-52. It.has not been said that there was any diffieulty in granting the subsidy for the exports under the Act. A reasonable restriction on a citizen's right to carry on his trade which alone is permitted by Art. 19(6) of the Constitution, must be, as Mahajan, J., said in Chintaman Rao v. The State of Jl;Jadhya Pradesh( a restriction "which reason dictates", which "unlei;s it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19(1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19, must be held to be wanting in that quality." Here I do not find the balance struck nor the infliction of the loss a course which reason dictates. The loss which the restrictions imposed by the Act on the petitioners' trade caused to them, was by no means such as could only have been avoided by incurring a greater loss.

p. 67

I also think it clear that an object however laudable, cannot by itself and without more, make a restriction put on a citizen's right to carry on a trade for attaining that.object, reasonable. A restriction on a person's right to carry on his trade does not become reasonable, simply because it had been imposed on him to achieve an object of great necessity and un- . doubted merit. The reasonablent>SS has to be judged in the circumstances of the case and the object to be attained is only one of such circumstances. This, in my view, is too clear to require elaboration.

p. 68

It is not neeessary for me to pursue the matter further for it is not the respondents' contention that the 1·estrictio11s are reasonable notwithstanding that they <'anse loss. On the other hand, the contention of the respondents is for reasons to be presently stated that the Act really caused no loss and that being so the restrictions imposed by it cannot he said to be unrea.sonable. I proceed now to consider t.he respondents' rea.son for saying that the Act imposes 110 loss on the sugar manufacturers including the petitioners.

p. 68

It is fi1·st s;1id that though the exports result in n loss now, it may in future bring in profits. That hope is dearly only a pious hope. Aud whaf" is more, it is not a hope which has even been expressed in the nffidavits filed. on behalf of the respondents. On the contrary, these affidavits make it perfectly plain that in the foreseeable future there is no hope of export of sugar being made at a profit. Indeed, it is said in these affidavits that the scheme of the Act is bnsed on the pooling of the losses caused by the exports made under it. It is hardly neeessary to point out that if the exports con kl be expected t.o prnduce a profit in in the near future, the nocrcivc machinery of the Act for making the exports would he unnecessary. There is no bn,is whntcver for snying that in some years the export may result in a profit. Indeed on the respondents' own affidavits it is not open to them to say that they hope that it may be possible in future to make a profit oil export of sugar.

p. 68

Then it is said that the export quota. fixed for 1957-58 is only 2! per cent. of the production of each factory. The point sought to be made is that, therefore, the amount of the loss would be very small. Now 2l per cent. of the produrtion of the factory of the petitioners in Writ Petiti 1n No. 9 of 1959 is 12,533 maunds. It is stated by t.he respondents in the supplementary affidavit of Shri Jain affirmed on March 11, 1959, that on the export the loss will be in the region of Rs. 10 per maund. On this basis the loss to the petitioners in that petition would be Rs. 1,25,530. The loss to the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 14 of 1959 would be slightlY. less. I for myself would hesitate to say that losses in such amounts are negligible. The export quota for 1958-59 has been fixed at 5 }Jer cent. of the production. Naturally, the loss would be much larger. The Government have the right under the Act to increase the quota upto 20 per cent. The loss if the quota increased to the utmost would be formidable. In the cases of factories with larger production the losses would be much larger than the petitioners losses. And of course the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the Act has to be tested generally and without reference to any particular sugar mannfacturer. I am also unable to agree to the proposition that the reasonableness of a restriction depends on the quantum of the loss it produces. Even a small loss may conceivably make a restriction causing it, unreasonable. The quantum of the loss cannot by itself decide the reasonableness of the restriction. Does reason dictate that a small loss shall be inflicted? Nothing that has been said in this case leads me to hold that.

pp. 68–69

It is then said that the loss caused by the Act was recouped by an order made by the Government increasing the home price of the sugar and therefore in fact the manufacturers suffered no loss. The process of recoupment was thus stated in paragraph 14 of the said main affidavit of Shri Jain:

p. 69

" The incidence of loss on the first quota of 50,000 tons fixed by the Government was assessed and when the Central Government fixed the price of sugar for internal consumption under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and the Sugar (Control)

p. 69

Order, 1955, they gave adjustment in price by adding 50 nP. per nrnuud in the ex-factory prices of sugar for internal s:iles." It is said that the increase so made in the home price of sugar would completely wipe out the loss incurred on the export under the Act of 2~ per cent.. of thl' produce of a factory. I will accept this as a correct estimate. I will also ignore the petitioners' contention that they had not been able to Hell the sugar in the home m,trket at t,hc incre•tsed price. ·

p. 70

The argument then is that though the impugned Act produces a loss, that loss can he ignored because the Government has taken steps under another Aut to recoup the loss so occasioned. It is s1tid that in the circumstances that prevail, namely, the increase in the homo price, the restrictions imposed by the impugned .\ct cannot he said to be unreasonable, for on the whole they occasion no loss. This is indeed the principal contention of the respondents to establi"h tfoit t.lie restrictions are not unreasonable.

p. 70

Now a reference to the Essential Commodities Act under which t,he home price was increased ha" to be made, Jt. wa" passed in Hie year 1955. It was not intended to ont·n foreign exchange; indeed it had nothing to do with foreign exchange or with helping the sugar industry. Section 3 of this Act provides:

p. 70

"Section 3. (l) If the Central Government is uf opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade ,i,nd commerce therein.

p. 70

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (l), an order made thereunder may provide

p. 70

(c) for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold." Sugar is an essential commodity within the meaning of that term in the Act. Under the powers conferred by the section quoted above, on August 27, 1955,. the Government passed an ordf;lr called the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955. Clause 5 of that order provides that,

pp. 70–71

"(1) The Central Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix the price or the maximum price at which any sugar may

p. 71

. . ,. e so . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . uc price or maximum price Id Sh shall be fixe<l with due regard to the price or minimum price fixed for sugar cane, manufacturing cost, taxes, reasonable margin of profit for producer and/or trade, and any incidental charges.

p. 71

(2} Where the price or the maximum price has been so fixed no person shall sell or purchase ........... . any sugar at a price in excess of that fixed under subclause (l)." It was under this Order that the Government issued a Notification on July 30, 1958, enhancing the home price of sugar by 50 nP. per maund which it is said wipes out the loss caused by the impugned Act.

p. 71, margin B

I will assume that the Notification increasing the price was issued with the object of recouping the loss caused by the impugned Act as stated in the affidavit of Shri ,Jain, though the Notification itself does not say so. The question then is, is the increase in the home price of sugar made by the Government by a Notification issued under the powers given to it by another Act which has the effect of wiping out the loss inflicted by the impugned Act, a circumstance which makes the restrictions imposed by the latter Act reasonable?

p. 71, margin B

It is said that this is so ; that in judging the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by one Act, it is permissible to consider an order made by the executive Government under another Act. We were referred to the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State of Madras v. V. G. Rao (1). The learned Chief Justice there stated at p. 607:

p. 71, margin B

"The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict."

pp. 71–72, margin B

I respectfully agree with all that the learned Chief Justice sairl, but 1 am unable to see that this advances the present contPution of the respondents. W'hat is

p. 72

II . . . . rea Y re 1 upon that port10n of the learned Cluef Justice's obs<'rvation where he snid tha.t the pre\•ailing conditions nt the time should be taken in into account. Ruppnrt. is sought a.lso from a.noth0r observation of the learnPd Chi<'f .Tnstice at t.\w snme pagP which 1 lrn ve not quotPd, to the effect t !mt. reasonableness has to be decided in all the circumstances of a givPn case. It is said that the prm·ailing conditions anrl the circumstances of the case would inclrnfo 1-hc orrler increasing the home price of sugar made under the Essential Commorlit.ies Act. 1 am entirely unable to 11grec that suuh n thing was in the contemplation of the learned Chief ,Jnsticn. The case before him was uomplctely different. He <.'as not co!lsidning the reasomtbleness of one Ad. bv refrrPnce to an order made hr the Govcl'nment u;1der another. The learned Chief lustiee was considering whether a certain Act had placed unreasonable restrictious on the firnrlamental right to form associations. The Act had given t.hc C:.overnment the right to dechirl' an association an unlawful association on cprt>tin specified grounds. In holdi11g the restrictimrn imposed by the Act nmmsona.hle, the learned Chief .J m<tice observed 11t p. 608, "The formula of snbjPC'tive ~>ttisfad.ion of the Covernnwnt or of its officers, with an Ad \'isory Board thro\Yll in to review the materials on which the Government sePks to override a bnsic freedom !!Uaranteed to the citizen, may he viewt'd as reasonable only in very exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest limits and cannot receive judicial approval as a general pattern of reasonable restrictions on fundamental rights." I do not at all set' that the respondents can derive any support for their present contention from anything that Patanjali Sastri, C.J., said.

p. 72

I entirely agree that in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by a statute, all the prevailing conditions and all the circumstances of the case have to be considered. But I am wholly unable to see that the conditions or circumstances, which seem to

pp. 72–73

. . l d h h" h me to mean the same t hm_g, can .me u. e t at w depends solely on the arbitrary discretion or generosity or the sense of fair play of another. That, in my view, is not permissible. That is not a reasonable test. It is not reasonable to say that the validity of a statute would depend on something which the executive Government may do or undo at any time. The statute imposing the restrictions does not give any right that the Government would do something to make the restrictions reasonable. How can such a restriction be reasonable? How can an Act which is prima facie unreasonable-and it is on that basis that the present argument arises-be held to be reasonable because of something to which it gives no right and the existence of which depends entirely on the choice of the executive Government ? Is it to be said that the restrictions imposed by a statute are reasonable because the Government has, when the question cropped up, done something which makes the restrictions reasonable though it was not bound to do that and though it is free to undo that which it has done ? To say that would be to say that the Act is valid because the Government has for the time being chosen to make it so. This seems to me to be against all known principles of law.

p. 73

Furthermore, if the respondents' contention was right a statute would then be legal when the Government chooses to do a thing and illegal when it undoes it and so on from time to time at the choice of the Government. That would be intolerable in any legal system. It was said that this is unavoidable and may happen in many cases. The following illustration was given. Suppose in famine conditions a statute was passed controlling free sale of foodstuff. Assume that the prevailing conditions made the restrictions put on free sale reasonable. Later. normal conditions returned which made the control of sales of foodstuff unnecessary and therefore unreasonable. The Act would thereupon become invalid. But further suppose that after sometime the famine conditions returned. The validity of the Act would then be restored. Hence, it is said that there would be nothing unusual in the Act b . rd d . ]"d f t" t t" B t •t emg va an mva. 1 . rom 1me o 1me. u . seems to me that thIS no analogy. The famme conditions imagined do not depend on the choice of the Government. So, assuming that the appearance and disappearance of famine conditions from time to time made the Act o~ce valid and again invalid-as to which I do not feel c lled upon to say anything nowthat does not justify' the adoption of a rule which would make the validity of an Act depend on the choice of the Government. If fluctuating validity is the result in one case, it does not follow that the same consequence would occur in another and a totally different case.

pp. 73–74

Again the validity of the Notification enhancing the home price seems to me to admit of grave doubt. I find nothing in the Essential Commodities Act nor naturally in the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, which would authorise the Government to increase the price simply for the sake of recouping to the manufacturers the loss caused to them by the impugned Act. I have earlier set out the relevant provisions of the Essential Commodities Act. The power to fix the prir ~ of sugar given thereby can be exercised " for maintaining or increasing the supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices". That power cannot therefore be exercised for recouping loss caused to a manufacturer by another Act, the object of which is to earn foreign exchange. If it is said that the Notification was issued for the purposes mentioned in the Essential Commodities Act, it becomes at once apparent, that the price fixed under it has no relation to the impugned Act and may have to be altered irrespective of the latter Act. I find it impossible to say that a Notification fixing the price of sugar on different conditions can be taken into account in deciding the reasonableness of the impugned Act which is entirely unconnected with these considerations.

p. 74

For all these reasons I am unable to agree that the Notification increasing the home price can be taken into consideration in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act. It follows

pp. 74–75

. . d l t tl th a t th ese res notions t o cause oss o sugar manufacturers and there is nothing to show that the restrictions are even so reasonable.

p. 75

Then it is said that the Indian ~ugar Mills Association of which the petitioners <1l'e Raid to be members, wanted that arrangements for export. of sugar abroad be made and it was for that reason that the impugned Act was passed. It was suggested that the Association agreed to the Act being passed. It is therefore contended that the restrictions imposed by the Act must presumed to be reasonable and the petitioners cannot be heard to say that they are not. Now the request by or the agreement of the Association is of course not the request by or the agreement ofthe petitioners. The Association has no authority to bind the petitioners by any request or agreement. The fact that the petitioners were members of the Association that were so, does not give the Association the authority. There is no evidence that the petitioners had assented to the Association making the request or the agreement. l!'or all that is known the petitioners may have been agaim;t the As::;ociation making any request to the Government to take steps for export or agreeing to the passing of the Act. Therefore, seems to me that the petitioners' rights are not affected by anything which the Associctt.ion might have done.

p. 75

I think it/ right also to say that there is no material on the record whatever to lmtd to the conclusion that the Association had agreed to the Act being passed in the form in which it stands. And of course it is only the Act with which we arc concerned. It is true that the Association had suggested that the Government should take steps for export of sugar. That would a.ppra.r from the minutes of various meetings annexed to thl' affidavits used on behalf of the Government. But there is nothing in these minutes nor anywhere else in the records which would indicate tlrnt the Association wanted that sugar should be exported though that might put the manufacturers to a loss. The position appears to have been this. In the yaar 1951-52 the sugar manufacturers were placed in a difficult position because of competition from khandsari and gur manufacturers, who could buy sugar cane for their manufactures at a low price in the open market, while the sugar manufacturers were compelled to buy cane at prices fixed by the Government which were high. So some of them, as appears from Annexure "A" to Shri Jain's said affidavit, made the following suggestions to the Government in March 1952 to give them relief:

pp. 75–76

" (a) The price of cane be reduced to Re. 1 per maund.

p. 76

(b) The sugar manufactured from the lower priced cane be 'frozen' and kept as a national Reserve for Export or for such other purposes as the Government may consider desirable.

p. 76

(c) To reduce the accumulation of stocks in the factories and to make room for further storage, and to liquidate the stocks into cash, serious efforts be made either from Government to Government or through trade channels to export out at least 2 lakh tons: Alternatively, the State Governments be asked to take delivery of the quantities from the factories and store them in their own godowns.

p. 76

(d) If there is any 'profit' in the export of such quantities the same may be utilised either for giving a. 'bonus' to the cane growers or in lowering the price of sugar for home consumption." It is clear from the suggestions thus made by the manufacturers that they wanted the burden on them to be relieved and export at Government's cost. In that year the Government in fact permitted an export of 10,000 tons and gave a subsidy of Rs. 2 per maund to cover the loss on the export. Later in the same year tho Government reduced the price at which the sugar manufacturers could purchase the cane.

p. 76

In the years 1952-53 to 1955-56 India imported large quantities of sugar and did not export sugar at all. It also appears that during these years the consumpt.ion of sugar in India was much more than the production. Hence, obviously the need for the import. So clearly in these years the sugar manufacturers did not need to export their sugar. The respondents do not say that during these years the sugar m~nufacturers had asked for arrangements for export bemg made. 1956-57 was the year of the Suez crisis. In this year a substantial quantity was exported and large profits could be made because price of sugar in some of the markets abroad

pp. 76–77

. . d b th ~ •t d a gone up d ue to th e crisis cause y e •:iuez s1 uation. The proposition then is that between 1952-53 and 1956-57 the industry was doing very well and had no need to ask for Government's intercession to enable it to export.

p. 77

There is no evidence that in 1957 -58 there was. any over-production. The figures for this year in tons are production-19,75,000, consumption-20,14,000 and export-50,000, the figure for export being that fixed under the Act. It appears however that various representatives of the Government and the sugar manufacturers met and decided upon the idea of exporting sugar for earning foreign exchange in Government's inkrest and getting a foothold in the world market in the int~rests of the manufacfurers. It was realised that the export would result in a loss but the manufacturers agreed to export provided they were allowed to make up the loss from the internal market. For this purpose the imggestion made as appears from annexute "D" to the affidavit of Shri Jain, was as follows:

p. 77, margin H

"The internal market will be Jen free as at present. However to provide an element of stability to the market releases for internal sale shall be regulated by Government of India in active consultation with the industry."

p. 77, margin H

So what the trade had agreed to was that they would be prepared to export sugar provided they were left free to recoup from the internal sales the loss caused by the export. This is very different from agreeing to the Act which made no provision for recouping the loss from the internal sales. The sugar manufacturers did not approve of the Act, being content to depend on the Government's sense of fair play to relieve the hardship caused by it.

p. 77, margin H

There remains one other contention to deal with. It · 'd th t th · t' bl ' h

p. 78

1s sa1 · a · e restrw 1011s are reason a e smce t ey result in stabilising the sugar industry. Apart from saying that the Act would stabilise the sugar industry, the affidavits used on behalf of the respondents do not show how that would be done or that there was any need for it. From what I have earlier stated it does not appear to me that the industry needed any stabilisation. The figures given earlier show that production has always been less than internal eonsumption, excepting for the year 1951-52. But it appears from one of the annexurcs to the affidavit of Shri Jain that even 'then the difficulty was only temporary. It is there stated :

p. 78

"Again in 1952-53 it was decided to export upto 2 lakh tons. But only about 10,000 tons could be exported as in the meantime there was an appreciable rise in the sugar prices and the surplus stock was consumed in the home m>trket." The estimated figures for th11 Y'"" 19:38-59 in tons appear to be as follows: production-· 19,00,000 consumption-21,00,000, export-1,00,000. It would thus appear that the sugar industry in India has always been stable and did not require any export to make it stable.

p. 78

What I think however puts the matter beyond tlou bt is s. 4 of the Act. Under that section, in fixing the total quantity of wgar to be exported in any season regard is to be had only to the quantity available in India, the quantity required for consumption in India and the necessity of earning foreign exchange. l:;o in deciding the quantity to be exported no question of stabilising the industry or prices arises. Again, it is not out of the excess of the production over the internal consumption alone that the exports are to be made. In fact there has never really been any excess of production over consumption requirements. Indeed it is plain that if sufficient sugar were left to meet the home consumption, then the. increased price would not help the industry to recoup the loss. If supplies were adequate to meet the demand the price cannot be forced up.

p. 78

I therefore come to the conclusion that the Act which makes the petitioners suffer a loss on the sale of a part of their produce imposes a restriction on their right to carry on their business which cannot in the circumstances of this case he said to be reasonable

p. 79

' th " ' l'd an d ereiore inva

p. 79

I may also mention that the learned counsel for the petitioners had taken certain other objections to thP validity of the Act but in the view that I have earlier indicated I do not. consider it necessary to discuss the other objections.

p. 79

I would allow the petitions with costs.

p. 79

SuBBA RAO J.-J have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Hidayatullah, J. I agree with his conclusion but would prefer to give my own reasons. The only justification for me to write a separate judgment is my inability to persuade myself to agree with one of the reasons given by Hiday~tullah, J., for his conclusion. That reason involves a principle of far-reaching importance, namely, whether, in ascertaining the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by a statute on a fundamental right, it is permissible to rely upon a notification issued by Government in exercise of power conferred on it by another Act unconnected with the impugned one. ·

p. 79

Before I embark upon the merits of the case it would be convenient at the outset to clear the ground by expressing my view on the said question. The facts of the case have been fully stated by my learned brother in his judgment, and I need not restate them except to notice a few relevant and material facts. The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955), was enacted for the purpose mentioned in the preamble to that Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 3 of the said Act, the Central Government issued an order dated August 27, 1955, called the Sugar(Control) Order, 1955. Under r. 5 of the said order, the Central Government is empowered, inter alia, to fix the price or the maximum price at which any sugar may be sold or delivered, having regard to the price or minimum price fixed for sugar.cane, manufacturing cost, taxes, reasonable margin of profit for producer and/or trade, and any incidental charges. In exercise of powers conferred on the Central Government under s. 3 of the

pp. 79–80

said Act and cl. 5 of the said order, the Central '"Government issued a notification dated July 30, 1958, fixing the ex-factory price for Indian sugar Standard (ISS) D-29 grade. A few days before the said order was issued i.e., on .June 27, 1958, the Central Government promulgated an Ordinance called the Sugar Export Promotion Ordinance, and it was subsequently converted into an Act (30 of 1958), which received the assent of the President on September 16, 1958. It is said that the Central Government in fixing the price for sugar produced during the season 1957-58, in vacuum pan sugar factories situate in the areas specified in the order had taken into account the possible loss the exporters might incur by reason of the application of the provisions of the impugned Act. Shri K. P. Jain, Chief Director in the Directorate of Sugar& Vanaspati, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Department of Food), in his affidavit says that the ex-factory price of sugar per maund fixed by the said order was made up of the following items:

p. 80

Average cost of production including margin of profit. Rs. 22·91 Excise duty. Rs. 10·70 Cane cess. Rs. 1·89 Loss on exports. Rs. 0·50

p. 80

Total Rs. 36·00 It is explained therein that the factories are expected to realise actually on their internal sales Rs. 22·91 as their cost of production including margin of profit and Rs. 0·50 to cover losses of export which work out to approximately Rs. 10, per maund of sugar exported. For every one maund of sugar exported, the factories have for sale in the internal market 20 maunds of sugar, and on this, on account of the price fixed, they would realise 0·50 nP. per maund i.e., on 20 maunds Rs. 10, which covers the export loss. The effect of the said order is that the possible loss to the sugar exporters is off-set by the fact that they can recoup their

pp. 80–81

· h · · 1 t d l oss m t eir mterna ra e.

p. 81

The learned Attorney-General sought to justify the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act , on the ground, among others, that the Court should rely upon the said order in determining whether the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act are reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision of this Qourt in State of Madras v. V. G. Row ( That decision was concerned with the question whether s. 15(2)(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (14 of 1908), as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, was unconstitutional and void. It was contended in that case that the said provision fell within the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative abridgement of the fundamental right conferred on the citizens under Art. 19(l)(c) of the Constitution. The said limits are defined in cl. 4 of the said article whereunder:

p. 81

"Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the States from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause." In discussing the said question, Patanjali Sastri, C.J., observed at p. 607 :

p. 81

" It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonl:!obleness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in n,ll the circunrntn,nces of n, given case, it

pp. 81–82

l I h 1 . I I "l 1 d I I 111ev1ta ' e t '1t ~ ie socm u osop iy. an . t 1e sea. e. values Of the ]Udges partw1p1ttillg tne deern1011 should play an important part, mid the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictat.ed by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint 1tnd the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for p<>ople of their way of thinking but for all, and that the mnjority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable." If I may say so with respect, this passage summarizes the law on the subject folly and precisely. "Vhat is reasonable in a pnrticular set-up may be unreasonable in a society with a different background. The learned Counsel relying upon the words "prevailing conditions" and the subsequent words "in all the circumstances a given case" contai1rnd in the above observation Patanjali Sastri, C. J., contended that the said words were comprehensive enough to take in notifications issued by the Government., and, therefore, the said order of the Central Government fixing the rate would be one of the elements to be taken into consideration in testing the reasmmbleness of the impugnl'd Act. find it difficult to accept this <ugmnent. The learned Attorney-General has not been itble to place before any decision which "·ent to the length of holding that such notifications could enter the judicial verdict. is truii that the prevailing conditions at the time the Act was nmde should be taken into considt,ration, for the effectiveness of restriction imposed for a particuhu purpose depends upon the said conditions. In society addicted to opium, the legislature has to make a law imposing severe restrictions on the right conwme the same. In a society where a particular vice i8 rampant, any restriction imposed to eradicate that Yi<>e has to be moulded in accordance with the needs of the time. During times of stress and strain, such as war or pestilence, greater restrictions may imposed on a fundamental right to do business public interest. But the same restriction may be unreasonable in norm&l times. Even in normal times, the urgency of a social or economic reform, having regard to the sub-normal stancfards of human existence, may demand more stringent restrictions on fundamental rights than during times of prosperity. The

pp. 82–83, margin F

· f J · } · l • J · • l · l earnc d Cl ue ustice, t iere ore, m 11s grap uc escription of the test of reasonablenefi!s, in my view, was not stating any thing more than the obvious, for the standard of reasonableness is inextricably conditioned by the state of society and the urgency for eradicating the evil sought. to be remedied. But I am clear in my mind that·the validity of an Act shall not be made to depend upon another Act unconnected with the impugned Act or power conferred thereunder, which .might, if properly exercised, off.set the evil tendency or the vice of the impugned Act. If the validity of an Act is made to depend upon such a foundation, a super-structure will have been built on shifting sands. To do that is to destroy the stability of legislation and to introduce an uncertain element therein. If two or more Acts were parts of the same scheme or plan, to implement the same or common objective, or if the impugned Act, though it was not originally conceived at the time when the earlier Act was passed, was only an extension or a further step by legislature for implementing the object of the earlier Act or if the legislature by express reference incorporated in the impugned Act the provisions of the earlier Act, it would be permissible to rely upon the said provisions of the earlier Act, not because they formed part of the prevailing ·conditions but because either the earlier Act formed part of the impugned Act by reference or both of them formed part of the same legislative plan. The illustrations are not exhaustive, but they all fall under one or other of the following two categories : (i) an earlier Act is made part of a new Act; and (ii) both Acts are parts of a legislative scheme or plan where both of them were conceived at the inception but passed in stages, or conceived at different times on the basis of experience gained but passed in furtherance of the same scheme. In such cases, the test of reasonableness in regard to one Act may depend upon the impact of the other on it. beyond_ this is to destroy t~e stability of and to mtroduce an uncertam element. To and to depend upon a notification of nature issued under an unconnected Act the statute in a fluid state. In such a validity would depend . upon a statutory temporary duration; 4t would change colour changing attitudes of an authority empowered the order. It would also mean that a Court to embark upon a roving search of all Acts notifications which may, by design alleviate or mollify the evil consequences impugned Act. Such a result cannot be contemplated. The learned Attorney-General has not placed before us any decision in support of his broad propositian; I find in the judgment of my learned Hidayatullah, J., a few decisions which, it the full length of supporting the argument learned Attorney-General. I have carefully perused the said decisions and I do not find anything implied therein to support the said contention. decision in Attorney-General for Alberta General for Ca:nada (1) was concerned with between the jurisdictions of the Dominion cial Legislatures under ss. 91 and 92 of North America Act, 1867, The Legislative Assembly of the Province of Alberta passed an Act the taxation of banks' and imposed thereunder every corporation or joint stock company the Bank of Canada, incorporated for the doing banking or savings bank business Province, an annual tax, in addition payable under any other Act. Defaulters of tax were to be visited with penalties, payment of either tax or penalty could be enforced by distress and sale of goods and chattels, action for civil debt. It was contended before the Privy Council that the proposed not in its true sense taxation in order to of a revenue for Provincial purposes so as to be within the exclusive legislative competence of the Provipcial Legislature, but was merely part of a legislative plan to prevent the operation within the Province of those banking institutions which had been called into existence and given the necessary powers there to conduct their business by the only proper authority, the Parliament of the Dominion, under s. 91 of the British North America Act, and the Bill was therefore ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. The Privy Council accepted the contention. :For the purpose of ascertaining the true plan underlying the bill, the Judicial Committee compared the relative legislative lists, took judicial notice of other Acts and the object and purpose of the Act in question. Having regard to the said consideration, it came to the conclusion that it was a colourable legislation aimed at to prevent the operation within the province of the aforesaid banking institutions. When a statute is attacked on the ground that it is a colourable legislation, i.e., it assumed a form apparently faliing within the legislative competence of the legislature but in effect and substance intended to reach institutions beyond its legislative competence, it is obvious that all the surrounding circumstances, including other acts operating in the Province, have to be scrutinized to unravel the fraud on power. This decision, in my view, cannot be invoked to serve the present purpose. Nor does the decision of the Judicial Committee in Lad,ore v. Bennett ( carry the matter further. The question in that case was whether the Provincial legislation in question did not encroach upon the exclusive legislative power of the Dominion Parliament in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency, interest or pr iv ate rights outside the Province. For ascertaining the pith. and substance of the impugned statutes, the Judicial Committee relied upon th.e report of the Royal Commission appointed to enquire into municipal and other affairs of the four municipalities in question. At p. 477, it is observed:

pp. 83–85

" Their Lordships do not cite this report as evidence of the facts there found, but as indieating the materials which the (~overnment of the Province had before them before promot.ing in the Legislature the ~t.atllte pugned." Tl . d . . h l' l

pp. 85–86

t tg question raised in the present case. The decision the Privy Council in Pillrti v. J.lfudanayake( is also not. of much relevance to the present case. The constitutional validity of the citizenshiJJ. Act, 1948, Ceylon, was questioned in tlrnt case. It was contended therein that the main object of that Act was to prevent the Indian Tamils from obtaining citize1rnhip of Ceylon am! that the Act was part. of a plan to effect indirectly something \\·hich the legislature had no power achit>\'e directly. The Judicial Committee pointed out, at p. 528:

p. 86

"It. must be shown ~iffirmatively by the party challenging a statute which is upon its face intra vires that it was e.nacted as part of phtn to effect indirectly something which the legislature had no power achieve directlv." TJ1e Judicial Committee relied upon the Inclian and Pakistani R(•sidPnts (Citizenship) Act, Xo. 3 of 1949, by which an Indian Tamil would b.'' an application obtain citizenship by registration and thus protect his descendante, provided lH• lmd a eertain residential qualification. \Ylwn objection \\·as taken against the Court rel.ving upon the stiic! Act, their Lordships disallowed the objection \\·ith the following remarks, at p. 529:

p. 86

"If there was a legislati,-e plan the plan must looked at as a whole, and when so looked at it evident, in their Lordships, opinion, tlrnt. the legislature did not intend to prevent Indian Tamils from attaining citizenship provided that they \\·ere suffidently connected with the island." In this case also the reliance on a subsequent Act was only to unravel the pl\in attributed to the Legisla. ture of Ceylon to deprive the Indian Tamils of citizen. ship by passing the impugned Act. The said three decisions, therefore, are not, and cannot be, authorities for the proposition now contended. To unravel a plan of fraud on powern, it would he necessary to scrutinize all the documents, whether legislative or otherwise, which hel1) to ascertain the truth. It may a so ue 1 necessary to look into another Act to ascertain the pith and imbstance of an impugned Act. But the same principle cannot be invoked for a,scertaining the reasonablenoHs of legislative restl'idiom; on fundarnental rights.

pp. 86–87

Now t·oming to the factR of the present case, it is not suggrRtcd that the Es;;;ential Commoditi~;;; Aet, 1955, and t.lw impugned Act form part of one scheme of legislation. Indeml the E;;;sential Commodities Act waH enacted to provide in the i11tore:-1t of the gen<:'ml publie for control of production, :rnpply and di:;trihution of, and trade and commerec in, certain commodities. The provisions of the Act di,;clo;;c that tho ohjcct of the Aet was to nrninta.in or to inerca,;e :mpplies of essential commoditir's and to secure their equitable di;;tribution and availability at fair prices. It was not one of itH objAct;;; to stimnlate foreign trarle or to earn foreign exchange. It is said that the notification issued by the Central Government under s. 3 of that Act and r. 5 of the Order made thereunder was to off-;;et the loss expected to be incurred under the Ordinance, and therefore, the Act whi('h supplanted the Ordinance, must be deemed to have been pn,ssed on the basis of that notification. To put it in other words, though the impugned Aet docs not confer any power or imposn a duty on the Uoveriiment to off-set tlte·loss by fixing the rates of sugar, having regn,rd to the expected losR, the mere fact that it could fix the rn.tes mHkr Home other Act would make the Act good though otherwi;;;o bad. If this argument be accepted a:; correct., even if the notifioation was not issued, the existence of such a power under some other Act would be enough to validate the impugned Act, for, thongh the notifimttion was not issued, it may be issued at laier siltgP. 'l'his argmncnt, if accepted, would leave the im pngnl.'d statut.e . in tl uid state, its validity or ot horwise depending upon the changing attitude of the authority concerned. I cannot, therefore, accept this rnntention.

p. 87

Let me now consider the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the Act, excluding the notificat' . d b h G'' I . d 10n . issue y t e overnmen.t. t .is . enacte to provide for the export of sugar m pubhc mterest, and for the levy and collection, in certain circumstances, of an additional duty of excise on sugar produced in India. Section 4 enables the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette to fix from time to time the quantity of sugar which may be exported during any period, and, in fixing such quantity, the Central Government should have regard to the quantity of sugar available in India, the quantity of sugar which, in its opinion, would be reasonably required for consumption in India, and the necessity for exporting sugar with a view to earning foreign excl;iange in the public interest. In exercise of that power, the Central Government should not fix the quantity of sugar for export as to exceed in any year in the aggregate twenty per cent. of the quantity of sugar prorlnced in India in the season ending wit.h the month of October falling within that year. Under s. 5, the Central Government is empowered to apportion the quantity of sugar fixed from time to time for. purposes of export under s. 4 among the owners in proportion to the quantity of sugar produced, or likely to be produced, by them respectively during the season referred to above. :'-iection 6 enjoins on the owners of sugar factories to deliver to the export agency, appointed under the Act, the sugar produced in their factories in such quiintities, of such grade, in such manner, within such time and iit such place, as may be specified hy the export agency in that behalf. When such delivery is made, the owner ceases to have any more right over the sugar except to receive payment ·therefor. Section 8 empowers the export agency, after taking delivery, to export the sugar or permit the owner to sell the whole or any part of the export quota in his custody at a price approved by it on condition that the sale-proceeds are payable to it. Section 9 directs the export agency to make payments to the owners, who had delivered sugar to it, in the manner prescribed by the section. Out of the total sale-proceeds, the total expenditure incurred by the export agency in respect of the sugar exported should

pp. 88–89

· d d d e e ucte d an d l tie b a ance s ou 1 h ld b e apport1one

p. 89

. • h t" f among t e owners m h proportion to t e quan 1ty o sugar delivered by them for export during the year. It also enables the export agency to make payments to owners on account against documents of delivery of sugar furnished by them, and to adjust such payments at the time of final payment. Section 10 confers power on the Central Government to give directions to the export agency in discharge of its functions under the Act. Section 7 deals with a situation when the ~ugar is not delivered, and it reads:

p. 89, margin B

"S. 7(1): Where sugar delivered by any owner falls short of the export quota fixed for it by any quantity (hereinafter referred to as the said quantity), there shall be levied and collected on so much of the sugar despatched from the factory for consumption in India as is equal to the said quantity, a duty of excise at the rate of seventeen rupees per maund." Sub-ss. 2, 3 and 4 provide for a machinery for imposing the penal duty and collecting the same from the defaulting owners of sugar. The scheme of the Act, therefore, is a self.contained one. The object is to provide for the export of sugar in the interest of public and that object is sought to be achieved by fixing the quota of sugar for export and distributing the same among the owners of factories; subject to the condition that in no case it should exceed twenty per cent. of the quantity of sugar produced in India in a particular season. The quantity is also fixed \vit.hout detriment to the requirements for internal consumption. The apportionment of the quota among the various factories is objectively and impartially made. The quota delivered, or in case the owner is allowed to sell the sugar himself, the sugar purchased from the sale-proceeds, is· exported, and the nett sale-proceeds are distributed among the owners in proportion to the quantity of sugar delivered by them for export. The Act enables the Government to make payments on account. The Government also retains an over-all control presumably to see that no injustiee is done to the parties concerned. The short question is whether the said restrictions on the freedom of the petitioners to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and carry on trade or business, are reasonable within the meaning of clauses (5) and (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The restrictions must have a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to achieve and must not go in excess of that object. What is the object of the legislature ? The object of the legislature is to provide for the export of sugar in public interest. It cannot be, and indeed it is not, denied that at the time the Act was passed there was a sincere and serious national effort to industrialize our country with the avowed object of raising the economic standards of our people. One of. the necessary conditions for industrializing our eountry is to start heavy industries, and that cannot be done unless the country earn8 foreign exchange to enable it to import plants for starting the same. It is also self-evident that it would be in the interests of sugar industry to build up a foreign market for that commodity. The object of the Act was, therefore, demorrntrably to serve the national interest and the scheme evolved certainly had relation to the object sought to he achieved, for all the provisions of the Act were conceived in :t glmuine attempt to induce foreign export in sugar by co-operative effort. If so, the only ohjcetion to t.he rnstrictions imposed can be on the basis that the fr••edom w11,s abridged or curtailed unduly or arhitmrily. But for the Act, the petitioners could have Kold their sugar in the open market without exceeding the rnkK fix.,d under the Essential Commodities Act, l!.J!i5. The correspondence filed in the case, marked '" 1tn11exures A, H and C, clearly demonstrates that both the irnlustry :i.s well as the 8tate were equally interested to stimulate foreign trade and build up a foreign market. Under the scheme embodied in the Act, three restrictions are imposed on the owners of factories: (i) They must contribute to the stock for export,. not exceeding twenty per cent. of the quantity produced in their factories; (ii) they are paid only their proportionate share of the nett sale-proceeds realised in the foreign market; and (iii) a penal cess is imposed on those who make default in supplying the goods. When once . . d d h t h A t . h , l ·. t it is conce e t a t e c serves t e nat10na m erest, I find it not possible to hold that the restrictions are unreasonable or excessive. The three restrictions are really the props of the scheme. If there was no statutory compulsion on the owners of factories to

pp. 89–91, margin B

· f th d d . supp l y a reasona e ract1on o bl f e sugar pro uce m their factories, the export agency would not get the requisite quantity of sugar for export. If there was no provision imposing a penal cess on defaulters, there would be no sanction to compel them to deliver their quota of sugar. Though the final payment was deferred till the nett sale-proceeds were realised, they would be paid the price for the sugar supplied, at the rates fetched in the foreign market. It is common case that at present the export trade in sugar ends in loss; but it cannot be predicated that it will be a chronic feature and there will not come a time. when the export trade in sugar will earn profits. It may be that a better scheme migl).t have been evolved by the legislature or it might be more beneficial from the standpoint of owners of factories if t.he State purchased the exportable <1uantity for ready cash and exported the same on its own account. But it is not for this Court to evaluate the comparative merits of different schemes so long it is satisfied that the scheme actually evolved stands the test of reasonabless. The correspondence between the State and the industry shows that the industry as a whole co-operated with the State in evolving the scheme, which culminated in the passing of the Act. The State as well as the industry are equally interested to stimulate foreign trade and build up foreign market. To capture foreign market or to have a substantive share therein is not an easy task, as it depends upon many imponderables, namely, the availability of sugar, its demand, its comparative ID;erit,s with the sugar produced in other markets, transport facilities, mutual agreement requift ments, international affiliations etc. Initial loss must have to be borne to get a ~oothold and the clear objective will have to be pursued purposrifully ciously. To achieve the said objective, with the of the industry and on the basis of past experience, th A t d b th p l" t Th

pp. 91–92

c was passe y e ar 1amen . e ene ma results flowing from the Act are significant. State earns foreigu exchange, and a foreign gradually built up for the future prosperity of sugar industry.

p. 92, margin E

In the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents an attempt was made to support the Act ground that it was intended to serve a dual of stablising the internal market and earn exchange for the country. An attempt made to link the one with the other, but the Attorney-General did not pursue that line in his argument, and I have, therefore, considered tion only from the st.andpoint of the compelling need of the State to earn foreign exchange, and range aim of the industry to build up a foreign I therefore, hold that the restrictions imposed statute on the furnlamental rights of the are not arbitrary, and .are reasonable within ing of Art. 19 of the Constitution.

p. 92, margin E

I agree with my learned brother, Hidayatullah, on the other questions raised in this case. result, the petitions are dismissed with costs.

p. 92, margin E

ORDER.

p. 92, margin E

In view of the opinion of the majority tions are dismissed with costs.

p. 92, margin E