FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, HARYANA AND OTHERS versus KELA DEVI AND ANOTHER

SHINGHAL, J. One Nathi held 36 standard acres and 8 standard units of land in village Bhanguri, and as the "permissible area" within the meaning of clause (3) of section 2 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, (hereafter referred to· as the Act) in his case was 30 standard acres, Collector (Surplus) Nuh, declared 6 standard a~res and 8 standard units of land as "surplus area", by bis order dated November 25, 1959. Nathi died on July 14, 1965, leaving his widow Smt. Kela Devi respondent No. 1, and his mother Smt. Mando respondent No. 2, as heirs. The two heirs made an appHcation under sections 10-A(b) and lOB of the Act stating that as the land of Nathi had been inherited by them in equal shares, and the holding with each one of them was much below the "permissible area" of 3Q standard acres, there was no "surplus area" .within the meaning of clause (5-a) of section 2 of the Ac~ and no part of it could there~ fore be utilised for allotment to other tenants. That application was however dismissed by Collector (Surplus) on March 13, 1967, on l!1e gronnrl that the "surplus area" declared in Nathi's life time had already been allotted to other tenants and could not be excluded from the holding iiJ the hands of his widow and mother. An appeal was taken to the Commissioner of Anlbala, but it was dismissed on January 30,

p. 1121, margin C

1968, as he took the view that the order of allotment of the "surplus t area"' of Nathi's holding amounted to "utilisation" of that land under secifon 10-A(a). A revision was taken 'to the Financial Commissioner,, but it was rejected on May 8, 1968, for the same reason. Smt. Kela Devi and Smt. Manda then approached the High Court of Punjab · and Haryana by a writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It was opposed by the present appellants on the gr8und 17- 743SCV79 that as the "surplus area" had been declared and allotted h>. vuious tenantS during the life time of Nathi (except for an area of 8 ·kanals in village Ghelab) the writ petitioners were not entitled to sueceed, as the "surplus area" had alre~dy been utilised. It was also pleaded that possession of eight pieces of Janel had already been deli:m"ed to the. tenants before the death of Nathi. The controversy before us docs not relate to those pieces of land which had been allotted to ·yarious ten~nts and of which possession was given to them during the life time of Nathi.

pp. 1121–1122, margin G

The learned Single Judge of the High Court who initially he11rd the writ petition allowed it by his judgment dated October 29, 1%8, in so far as it related to the portion of land of which possession had not been given to other tenants and, to that extent, he set aside the above men!ioncd orders of the Collector, the Commissionyr, and the Financial Commissioner by which the application of Smt. Kela De¥i and Smt. Mando was rejected. An appeal" was taken to a Division Beach of the High Coiirt, )mt it was dismissed on May 12, 1969. That is why the present appeal has been .{lled on the basis of the High Court's certificate under Article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution.

p. 1122

The only question which therefore arises for considcratioa is whether the High Court was right in taking the view that mere allotment of land to other tenants under section 10-A(a) of the Act did not ainount to utilisation of the "surplus area" when the re11ettled tenants had not taken possession under the allotment ordm.

p. 1122, margin D

It is not in controversy that it had been finally decided that the "surplus area" in the-case of Nathi was 6 standard acres and 8 stand-

p. 1122, margin D

ard units, and a decision to that effect was taken in his life time on P ·November 25, 1959. It is also not in dispute that orders were llll!de for the allotment of the "surpius area" to other tenants under section 10-A(a) of the Act which reads as follows-

p. 1122, margin D

"10-A(a) The State Government of any officer empowered by it in this behalf shall be competent to utilize any surplus area for the resettlement of tenants ejected, or to be·,._.

p. 1122, margin D

ejected, under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 9." While therefore the section empowers the State Government or its authorised officer to "utilise" any "surplus area" for the resettlement of tenants, the Act does not define what is meant by an ord« of utilisation under the section. A clue to what is actually meant by that expression, is however to be found in clause (b) of section 10-A which provides as follows,-

p. 1122, margin G

"10-A (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any <ether law for the time Q<:ing in force and save in the case of land acqui,red by the State Government under any law for -the time being in force or by an heir by inheritance no transfer or other disposition of land which is comprised in surplus area at the commencement· of this Act, shall affect the utili-

p. 1123

zation thereof in clause (a)." 1'he clause therefore has the effect of saving the land comprised in the "surplus area", if it has been acquired by an heir by inheritance, So where an heir succeeds by inheritance, as in this case, that basic fact would affect the utilisation of the surplus area even if only an order bas been made under clause (a) of section 10-A for its utilisation for the resettlement of other ' tenants but that order has not been implemented.

p. 1123

In order to understand the .full meaning and effect to the provi- ~ions of section 10-A, it is necessary to make a cross-reference to rules 18, 20-A, 20-B and 20-C of the Punjab Security of Larud Tenures Rules, 1956 (hereafter referred to as the Rules). Rule 18 deals with 1he procedure for allotment of "surplus area" to other resettled tenants. Rule 20-A provides for the issue of certificates of allotment 'Of lands to them, and rule 20-B provides for delivery of possession 8nd makes it obligatory for the resettled tenant to take possession of the land allotted to him within a period of two months or such extended period as may be allowed by the officer concerned. Rule 20cC provides, inter alia, for the execution of a "qabuliyat" or "patta" by a Tesettled tenant. It would.thus appear that while allotment of land is an initial stage in the process of utilisation of the "surplus area", it <locs not complete that process as it is necessary for the allotte to -Obtain a certificate of allotment, take possession of the land within the period specified for the purpose, and to execute a "qabuliyat" or "patta" ia 1espect thereof, The process of utilisation contemplated by section 10-A of the Act is therefore complete, in respect of any "surplus area", only when possession thereof has been taken by the allottee or the allottees and the other formalities have been comp!eied, and !"there is no force in the argument that a mere order of allotment has the effect oC completing that process.

p. 1123, margin C

'Reference in this connection may also be made to rule 20-D of the Rules which provides that in case a tenant does not take possession of the "surplus area" allotted to him for resettlement within the period specified therefor, the allotment shall be liable to be cancelled and the area allotted to him may be utilised for the resettlement of A. another tenant. It cannot therefore be dobted that a ~ompleted title does not pass to the allottee on a mere ·order of allotment, and that order is defeasible if the other c6nditions prescribed by law are not fulfilled. . . · .

pp. 1123–1124, margin G

~:

p. 1124

So. when the process of utilisation of Nathi's '.'siirplus area" had not been completed by the time his heirs by inheritance niade the aforesaid application to the authorities concerned, it wa8 permisSlble for those authorities to re-examine the question wllether there was any "surplus area'' at all after Nathi's holding had been inherited by his two heirs in equal shares so as to reduce the area of the holding of each one of them below the. permissible area. Tire High Court therefore rightly allowed· the writ petition of the respondents ..

p. 1124

As there is no force in this appeal, it is dismissed but, in the circumstances, we do not make any order as. to the costs. P.B.R. Appeal dismis&ed.

p. 1124