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Supreme Court of India

SHRI JAGDISH MILLS LTD. versus THE COMMISSIONEB OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY NORTH, KUTCH AND SAURASHTRA, AHMEDABAD

Decided
12 May 1959
Judges listed
SUDHI RANJAN DAS (as the open data lists them; this may not name the whole bench)
Disposal
Dismissed

Citations

Official
[1960] 1 S.C.R. 236 · 1959 INSC 78

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same effect and the appeal was allowed.

p. 247

The above ratio is really determinative of the question before us. The stipulation in the contract between the appellant ~nd the Government was that the payment would be made by cheques. The Government of India was located in Delhi and the cheques would be necessarily drawn by it from Delhi. Could it be imagined that in the normal course of affairs the cheques thus drawn in Delhi would be sent by a messenger to Baroda so that they may be delivered to the appellant in Baroda? Or that the officer concerned would come to Baroda himself and hand the same over to the appellant in Baroda? The only reasonable and proper way of dealing with the situation was that the payment would be made by cheques which the Government would send to the appellant at ~aroda by post. According to the course of business usage in general which appears to have been followed in this case, the parties must have intended that the cheques should be sent by post which is the usual and normal agency for transmission of such articles. If that were so, there was imported by necessary implication an implied request by the appellant to send the cheques by post from Delhi thus constituting the Post Office.its agent for the purposes of receiving those payments.

p. 247

Learned Counsel for the appellant further drew our attention to certain provisions of the Post Office Adi, '1898 and the postal regulations framed thereunder and tried to argue that the Post Office was really the agent of the Government and the Government could recall the cheques at any time before they actually reached the appellant at Baroda. All these provisions were discussed by this Court in the Commissione?· of lnrome-tax, Bombay South v. Messrs. Ogale GlaBs Works Ltd. (1), and it was held that these provisions did not help the assessee. The position as it obtains was thus summarised at p. 204:-

p. 248

" there can be no doubt that as between the sender and the addressee it is the request of the addressee that the cheque be sent by post that makes the post office the agent of the addressee. After such request the addressee cannot be heard to to say that the post office was not his agent and, therefore, the loss of the cheque in transit must fall on the sender on the specious plea that the sender having the very limited right to reclaim the cheque under the Post Office Act, 1898, the post-office was his agent, when in fact there was no such reclamation. Of course if there be no such request, express or implied, then the delivery of the letter or the cheque to the post-office is delivery to the agent of the sender himself.''

p. 248

In our opinion the principle which has been enunciated by us in the Commissioner of Income-tax; Bombay South v. Messrs. Ogale Glass· Works Ltd. ( is applicable to the facts of the present case;' even though the words "to remit the amount by cheque" have not been specifically used herein. Non-user of those words does not make any difference to the position and it is not possible to distinguish the present case from that case merely on this ground.

p. 248

We are, therefore, of opinion, that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in the conclusion to which it ·came and these appeals must accordingly be dismissed with costs, one set between the two appeals.

p. 248

Appeals dismissed. s.c.R. rss.

p. 248