Supreme Court of India
AJAIB SINGH versus GURBAX SINGH & ORS.
- Decided
- 17 November 1987
- Judges listed
- SABYASACHI MUKHERJI
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Citations
- Official
- [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1099 · 1987 INSC 338
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SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted.
p. 1100, margin C
The High Court in its judgment and order dated 9th July, 1986, has observed that the question of limitation has been canvassed before the High Court. The High Court expressed the view that there was a lot of conflict between the various High Courts on the interpretation of Article 54 of the Limitation Act which governed the point of limitation. The High Court, however, did not decide this question and expressed the view that due to passage of time prices of lands had gone up sky-high and it would be unjust to enforce the agreement of sale entered into. In other words, it appears that without deciding the question whether the claim of the plaintiff was barred by limitation or not, the High Court exercised its discretion in refusing to grant the· relief on the ground that there has been good deal of delay and the parties would suffer if specific performance of the agreement was granted. It appears from the facts that in this case the major portion of the agreed price had been paid long time-ago and the balance thereof was to be paid at the time of execution of the documents was a sum of Rs. 75 only. It further appears that possession of the premises was with the appellant for all these years in part performance of the agreement. In those circumstances, the principle upon which the High Court refused to exercise its discretion, in our opi,nion, was not applicable and such discretion was not proper. The High Court exercised discretion on wrong principles. See in this connection M.adamsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yellogi Rao & Two others, [1965] 2 SCR 221; Dr. Jiwan Lal & Ors. v. Brij Mohan Mehra & Another, [1973] 2 SCR 230 and see also the observation in Debendra Nath Manda/ v. Sakhilal Kar & Ors., AIR 1950 Calcutta 526.
p. 1100, margin C
In that view of the matter, we cannot sustain the exercise of discretion in the manner done by the High Court. This, however, does not decide the matter because the High Court declined to go into the facts and decide the question of limitation on merits, the High Court took the view in exercise of its discretion. Since we are not sustaining the High Court's exercise of discretion hence the order and the Judgment of the High Court are set aside but the matter is remanded to the High Court for its decision on the merits. The matter should be dis-
pp. 1100–1101, margin G
posed of by the High Court as early as possible. The appeal is accord- ~ ingly allowed with no order as to costs.
p. 1101, margin A
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.
p. 1101, margin A